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F O R E W O R D
In May 1998, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD-62), 
“Combating Terrorism” and made the fight against terrorism a national domestic 
security issue. This Directive creates a new and more systematic approach to achieve 
the President's goal of ensuring that we meet the threat of terrorism in the 21st 
century with the same rigor th a t we have met military threats in this century. PDD-62 
establishes the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure 
Protection, and Counter-Terrorism. The National Coordinator will oversee the broad 
variety of relevant policies and programs including such areas as counter-terrorism, 
protection of critical infrastructure, preparedness, and consequence m anagement for 
weapons of m ass destruction. NIOSH, DOD, and OSHA organized this workshop to 
bring together partners to coordinate activities in support of this Directive.
Over the fifteen months since publication of PDD-62, municipal, state, and national 
guard responder groups, particularly those in locations considered potential targets, 
have been hastily developing response and consequence management plans. These 
plans—which include establishing procedural and equipment infrastructures and 
training emergency response personnel for chemical and biological terrorism—have 
raised num erous issues about potential attack scenarios and agents, such as how 
best to address hazard detection, personal protective equipment, responder needs, 
and public health and medical concerns.
This Workshop provided a forum for over 140 subject-m atter experts representing 63 
different emergency responder, fire fighter, domestic preparedness, equipment 
manufacturing, federal research, and state and federal regulatory organizations. 
Participants openly discussed chemical and biological terrorism issues, exchanged 
information, and developed new partnerships. If attendance and participation are any 
indication of success, the Workshop was indeed successful. I wish to thank the co­
sponsors of this Workshop and the employees, employers and organizations that 
participated. I also wish to thank the attendees for their interest, their avid 
participation in discussions, and their tenacity to travel through a major winter storm 
to attend, because it was in the open dialogues th a t the key issues became obvious 
and opportunities for solutions surfaced. I look forward to continuing collaborations 
as we collectively pursue national domestic preparedness. □
Linda Rosenstock, M.D., M.P.H. 
Director
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E X E C U T I V E  S U M M A R Y
Since publication of Presidential Initiative 62, municipal, state, and national guard 
responder groups have been developing response plans and establishing the 
procedural and equipment infrastructures to capably respond to chemical and/or 
biological terrorism and other crisis situations.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) co-sponsored this 
technical Workshop together with the Department of Defense (DOD) -  US Army 
Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM) and the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA). Workshop objectives were to: 1) identify and 
understand the hazards associated with chemical an d /o r biological incidents, 2) 
identify the different responders and their respiratory protection needs, 3) determine 
which respirators and selection criteria are currently being utilized for response to 
these types of incidents, and 4) determine public health and medical community 
concerns which m ust be considered in developing a standard  for chemical and/or 
biological respiratory protective devices.
This Workshop provided a forum for over 140 representatives from 63 different 
emergency responder, fire fighter, domestic preparedness, equipment manufacturing, 
federal research, and state and federal regulatory organizations. Participants openly 
discussed issues, exchanged information, and learned about current re spiratory 
protection issues associated with incidents involving chemical and biological agents. 
The attendees were subject-m atter experts, stakeholders, and partners with a 
common interest of assuring proper respiratory protection for emergency responders 
and other worker groups faced with the responsibility of responding to incidents 
involving chemical and/or biological threats.
Presentations were given by representatives of government agencies, private 
laboratories, scientific experts, and rescue organizations. Participants explored the 
expertise and responsibilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National 
Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO), the Interagency Board for Standardization and 
Interoperability, NIOSH, DOD, SBCc Om , New York City Office of Emergency 
Management, and others.
Attendees gained a better understanding of the kinds of chemical and/or biological 
threats that are possible. Sources for obtaining further information were identified. 
The need for additional research, guidelines, and standards were identified in the 
following areas:
•  exposure limits and technology for assessing chemical and/or biological 
concentrations of response scenarios;
•  improved chemical and/or biological detection and monitoring 
capabilities;
•  reliable information with which to define acute vs. chronic doses and 
their immediate and long-term health effects;
•  applicability of military data.
-l-
Workshop participants believed that everyone associated with response to a chemical 
and/or biological incident needs to be adequately protected and th a t the level of 
protection required will vary. The diverse group of emergency responders potentially 
include: local public safety workers (fire fighters, police, HazMat, bomb squad, 
Emergency Medical Service [EMS]); local government specialty response (Department 
of Environmental Protection [DEP], Department of Highways [DOH], county 
emergency planning personnel, public health officials); local utility workers (electric, 
gas, water); state government specialty response (national guard, state emergency 
planning personnel, Department of Environmental Resources [DER], public health 
officials); federal law enforcement personnel (FBI, Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 
[ATF]); Public Health Service (PHS) (Disaster Medical Assistance Team [DMAT], 
National Medical Response Team [NMRT], Disaster Mortuary Team [DMORT]); private 
clinics and hospital workers.
The conference identified immediate responder needs in the following areas:
•  NIOSH certification of air-purifying respirators (APR), powered air- 
purifying respirators (PAPR), self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), 
and personal protective equipment (PPE) for use against these threats;
•  training assistance with PPE and respirator selection in domestic 
preparedness-planning;
•  alternatives to SCBA for certain threat scenarios;
•  assurance that SCBA will survive an exposure to chemical warfare 
agents and critical components will not be degraded;
•  implementation of DOD respirator standards, tests, and qualification 
requirements where applicable;
•  identification of appropriate cartridge/cannister performance tests; and
•  relevant protection factor (PF) protocols and valid assigned protection 
factor (APF) assessm ent methods.
The Workshop was closed with assurance th a t NIOSH, DOD, and OSHA will continue 
working with partners to investigate the funding and collaborations needed to develop 
certification standards for chemical and/or biological respiratory equipment and the 
other issues raised. Certainly, what can be achieved will be tempered or accelerated 
by the funding and resources that are or will become available. This report will be 
available upon request and may be used by attendees to form future partnerships and 
collaborations to address this emerging national issue. □
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P U R P O S E  &  O P E N I N G  R E M A R K S
Dr. Gregory W. Wagner, Director of the Division of Respiratory Disease Studies 
(DRDS) NIOSH welcomed participants to the Workshop and thanked them  on behalf 
of the DOD-SBCCOM, OSHA, and NIOSH. He stated th a t the purpose of the meeting 
was to take a first step in exploring respiratory protection issues by bringing together 
subject-m atter experts who have the common interest of ensuring th a t the workers 
who risk their own lives to save others are themselves properly protected against the 
most deadly respiratory hazards. Dr. Wagner stated that the experts in the room have 
the combined knowledge and resources to identify and understand chemical and 
biological hazards, establish user needs, define the respiratory protection needed to 
properly protect responders, and explore the issues associated with the public health 
and the medical community’s need for respirator protection.
Richard W. Metzler, Chief of the Respirator Branch, DRDS, NIOSH, described the 
program and agenda and reviewed the purpose of the Workshop:
•  To bring all interested parties together in a forum th a t would provide an
opportunity to exchange information.
•  To better understand “who is doing what.”
•  To identify and understand the hazards associated with responding to 
chemical and/or biological incidents.
•  To identify requisite responders and their ne eds for respiratory 
protection and other protective equipment.
•  To identify and understand the performance, reliability, and quality 
characteristics of respiratory protection that may be needed by 
individuals responding to chemical and/or biological terrorist incidents, 
particularly the respirator selection criteria currently utilized for such 
incidents.
•  To determine public health and medical community concerns which 
m ust be considered in the development of a voluntary standard for 
chemical and/or biological respiratory protective devices.
The Workshop agenda addressed four major topics: health hazards, user needs, 
respirator certification standards and the broader issues of public health. Each of 
these topics were introduced at a plenary session by one or two keynote speakers who 
are recognized experts on the topic. Each plenary session was followed by a 
workgroup exercise in which participants from diverse backgrounds addressed 
questions that were intended to define and answer issues relate d to that plenary 
session’s topic. Then, to facilitate the multiple viewpoints, the workshop was divided 
into four workgroups. After the workgroups addressed the prepared questions on a 
particular topic, a follow-up plenary session was held to receive, from all groups, 
presentations on their defined issues and answers to the topic questions. □
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W O R K S H O P  S E S S I O N S
S e s s i o n  # 1  
C h e m i c a l  a n d / o r  B i o l o g i c a l  I n c i d e n t s :  A s s o c i a t e d  H a z a r d s
The purpose o f Session #1 was to identify and understand the hazards associated 
with a response effort to a chemical and/or biological incident.
P le n a ry  P r e s e n ta t io n s  C h e m ic a l  a n d /o r  B io lo g ica l In c id e n ts :  A s s o c ia te d  H a z a rd s
F irs t P resentation : Jam es Genovese, US Army, SBCCOM
Mr. Genovese provided the military’s perspective on the most probable threats 
responders may face and the approach th a t should be utilized for effective re­
sponse. Mr. Genovese emphasized th a t the response to chemical and/or biological 
incidents will require a proactive integration of both sectors of our govern­
ment—military and civilian—in order to optimize effectiveness and minimize 
casualties to emergency responders at any level of city, regional, state, or federal 
government. He emphasized that a variety of readily available toxic materials could 
be utilized by a terrorist, including chemical and/or biological agents. Toxic 
industrial chemicals, as well as military-unique chemical and/or biological haz­
ards, may pose novel challenges to our current protection systems. [See Appendix 
D: Chemical and Biological Agents of Concern.] Because incident responders could 
be confronted with such a broad spectrum of hazards (from mildly toxic to lethal) 
and incident locales (from interior to exterior), it is param ount that we approach 
these response issues from a personal protective equipment systems perspective.
Second P resen tation : Andy Bringuel, FBI, NDPO
Supervisory Special Agent Bringuel addressed the NDPO programs being devel­
oped and NDPO’s assessm ent of the most probable domestic threats. Mr. Bringuel 
described the mission of the NDPO as developing an interagency effort to enhance 
coordination among federal programs offering terrorism preparedness assistance 
to state and local communities. Federal agency participation at the NDPO cu r­
rently includes the DOD, the Departm ent of Energy (DOE), the Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the FBI, the National Guard 
Bureau, the Office of Justice Programs (OJP), and others. State and local experts 
are also represented at the NDPO and provide input for the formulation of pro­
grams. The NDPO will become the clearinghouse for all weapons of m ass destruc­
tion (WMD) related issues and is organized into the following programs: planning,
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exercises, equipment, information dissemination, and health issues. Thus the 
NDPO will serve as a single program and policy coordination office for domestic 
preparedness programs for state and local communities. The NDPO is not intended 
to be the creation of a new federal bureaucracy nor will it subsum e the assistance 
programs under the management of other agencies.
W o rk g ro u p  D is c u s s io n s  C h e m ic a l  a n d /o r  B io lo g ica l In c id e n ts :  A s s o c ia te d  H a z a rd s
W hat hazards (risks and exposures) are no t w e ll de fined  or understood?
Terrorist acts demand public attention and education. Terrorism is being con­
ducted by highly-motivated, well-educated individuals and groups who are able to 
obtain the equipment and materials to effectively create m ass destruction through 
the use of chemical and/or biological weapons. Much remains to be understood 
about the hazards associate d with the response, management, and mitigation of a 
terrorist incident.
Several attendees pointed out that chemical and biological incidents may differ 
significantly and require separate and distinct procedures for response, m anage­
ment, and mitigation. For example, a chemical incident may produce many 
casualties with acute symptoms within m inutes after exposure to a lethal concen­
tration. Exposure to a biological incident will produce many casualties; however, 
symptoms may not manifest for a period of time, anywhere from 24 hours to three 
weeks later, depending on the agent used.
A concern was expressed that the risks and hazards associated with a response to 
a terrorist incident are not well-defined. Due to the lack of experience in dealing 
with these types of threats, and the uncertainties associated with the hazards and 
risks, both responders and the general public would experience increased levels of 
panic. It was suggested th a t training, utilizing the most current knowledge gleaned 
from mock disasters, is critical to responder readiness. Another suggestion was 
th a t military models for predicting hazards th a t exist for battlefield scenarios could 
be adapted to help model and predict the risks and hazards associated with 
domestic terrorism—assum ing the scenarios and the acceptable risk could be 
defined. A rebuttal discussion questioned the validity of such models and the level 
of risk that is acceptable for civilian responders who risk their own lives to save 
others.
The majority of the workgroup attendees agreed that chemical and/or biological 
threats are not well understood by civilian responders. For example, the chronic 
effects of repeated short-term exposures to many chemical agents are as yet 
unknown. Moreover, it is unknown how communities would need to manage 
situations involving biological agents because an incident might not be discovered
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until patients, who could have dispersed throughout the area, start showing up at 
doctor’s offices and hospital emergency rooms.
The group generally agreed that exotic agents, such as chemical warfare agents, 
would probably not be utilized because these agents are controlled and difficult to 
obtain and transport. The chemicals most likely to be utilized are hazardous 
industrial chemicals and these were discussed a t length. The DOD has developed 
a list of hazardous industrial chemicals that are of interest from a military per­
spective. Many attendees felt tha t agents th a t could be utilized in a domestic 
terrorist act need to be prioritized, based on scenarios that are probable for use in 
domestic settings.
The majority in the four workgroups agreed that emergency response to incidents 
involving chemical warfare agents should be handled as standard  hazardous 
materials incidents; however, some special training techniques and detection 
equipment will be required. One concern is that many responders entering 
contaminated areas in level A equipment (fully-encapsulated suits and SCBA) will 
need to be in level A protection for prolonged periods of time (8-12 hours). There 
are physiological stresses and hazards associated with long-term PPE utilization. 
Another concern is that response to a chemical warfare agent attack is signifi­
cantly different than  response to a traditional hazardous materials incident for 
which standardized procedures have been established. When responding to a 
traditional hazardous materials (HazMat) incident, information to identify the 
contam inant is usually quickly available (Bill of Lading, Placards, etc.) and enough 
information is available from sources that can be easily contacted to identify the 
associated hazards. This “advance” information will probably not be available at 
terrorist incidents.
Where do stakeho lders  ge t in fo rm a tio n  on the hazards?
Most information about the hazards associated with response, management, and 
mitigation of a chemical or biological incident is gained through domestic pre­
paredness training and other resources available to the response community. 
Government agencies identified as being able to offer technical expertise on these 
topics are the: Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), DOD, DOE, Department of Justice 
(DOJ), EPA, FBI, NDPO, FEMA, NIOSH, the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and OSHA.
There are several sources in the DOD that have interests and expertise on biologi­
cal and/or chemical terrorism. Currently, the United States Army utilizes the 
SBCCOM at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Edgewood to administer the Domestic 
Preparedness Training Program. This program has a mission of training 
the first responders of the 120 largest US cities about the hazards, response 
procedures, and equipment required to respond to a chemical and/or biological 
agent incident. Through the Domestic Preparedness Program, SBCCOM dissemi­
nates information and test data so that individuals responsible for selecting
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equipment can make appropriate choices. SBCCOM also m aintains a hot­
line—which provides real-time referrals—th a t municipal responders may utilize in 
the event of an incident.* For information on biologicals and infectious diseases, 
the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) located 
at Fort Detrick, Frederick, MD and the CDC and/or Agency for Toxic Substances 
and Disease Registry (ATSDR), Atlanta, GA are reliable sources.
Many attendees said they rely on trade and labor unions to provide information 
th a t is needed to prepare for and respond to chemical and/or biological incidents. 
Some of the organizations that are looked to for guidance and knowledge in this 
arena are the: International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), International 
Association of Firefighters (IAFF), International Association of Police Chiefs (IAPC), 
and International Chemical Workers Union (ICWU). ‘Standard tools of the trade,’ 
such as Chemical Transportation Emergency Center (ChemTrec), the Department 
of Transportation (DOT) Handbook, Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS’s), and the 
NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards are also utilized when responding to 
hazardous materials incidents, bu t do not necessarily contain specific information 
on biological and/or chemical warfare threats.
* Domestic Preparedness Help Line: 800-368-6498 or E-mail cbhelp@cbdcom.apgea.army.mil
* Toll free service 800-262-8200
Where are the gaps in  know ledge and resources?
There is no central source which provides technical and operational information 
about chemical and/or biological warfare agents or industrial agents. The majority 
of the attendees suggested that, as a priority, NDPO should establish a database of 
information on industrial and military agents. This database should contain 
literature which has been technically critiqued, unclassified, and readily available 
to responders. It was suggested that in the event that all information could not be 
unclassified, each city or municipality should have at least one individual who has 
the proper security clearances to access and obtain classified information from the 
military or federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. [Note: NDPO may 
have provided a solution to this: WMD coordinators have now been appointed and 
stationed at regional FBI offices.]
The majority of attendees agreed that sufficient information is not readily available 
with respect to reference materials. ChemTrec, the DOT Handbook, MSDS, and the 
NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards, do not contain adequate information on 
chemical and/or biological warfare agents. Attendees also said that a list of 
acceptable respirators and chemical protective clothing—qualified for responders 
to utilize in these scenarios—is needed. The NIOSH Pocket Guide should be 
updated to include chemical and/or biological th reat agents, be available as a CD 
ROM or Internet site, and contain PPE recommendations based on specific 
hazardous agent(s). This Guide should be available for every incident site.
Attendees expressed concerns th a t accurate, real-time, rapid response detection 
equipment does not exist, even though detection is key to selecting adequate
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personal protective equipment (PPE). Some attendees felt tha t adequate PPE 
decisions could not be made even if detection equipment did exist because there 
are still too many unknowns present, e.g., exposure limits do not exist, chronic 
effects of exposure have not been evaluated, etc. Furthermore, mixtures of agents 
may be present which detectors will not adequately detect—a serious concern 
because exposure limits and doses, as well as the acute and chronic effects of 
mixtures, are not known. Several participants suggested that using traditional 
industrial hygiene models, which compare environmental concentrations to 
recommended exposure limits, is adequate for selecting PPE.
Who are the a u th o ritie s  needed to  de fine  exposures and risks?  W hat 
program s m u s t be coord ina ted  to  b r in g  the a u th o ritie s  together?
Responders stated th a t they are obligated to follow OSHA regulations and NIOSH 
guidelines. Some stated that the solution is for NIOSH and OSHA to develop and 
coordinate a team of experts to address the protection issues associated with 
terrorism. It was suggested that NIOSH should: be the agency which provides an 
oversight role with regard to developing standards for personal protective equip­
m ent for chemical and/or biological applications; play a facilitation role with 
federal regulators and consensus standards organizations to ensure national 
acceptance of the standards and equipment that becomes available; and evaluate 
and offer input into the Domestic Preparedness Training Program currently 
administered by SBCCOM. Attendees emphasized that the user community must be 
involved in any efforts made to a.dvance technology in this arena.
Some attendees felt that consensus standards organizations, such as the Ameri­
can National Standards Institute (ANSI) or the National Fire Protection Association 
(NFPA), may be the best mechanism for creating standards. Recommendations 
could then be adopted by the federal agency responsible for coordinating efforts 
related to chemical and/or biological hazards and threats. However, these types of 
standards are generated by achieving consensus from committee members and 
when agreement cannot be achieved, changes are made, based on majority 
opinions, th a t do not always result in the most protective standards. Other 
attendees argued that consensus standard organizations have a long lead time 
th a t is no faster than  the federal regulatory promulgation process; thus they would 
rather have federal regulations controlling the effectiveness, quality, and reliability 
of the equipment being developed rather than  consensus standard organizations.
The following is a list of authorities who need to be involved in defining policies 
and standards: the American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP), the CDC, 
the DOD’s SBCCOM and USAMRIID, the DOE, the DOJ, the FBI, equipment 
m anufacturers, FEMA, IAFF, IAFC, NDPO, NFPA, NIOSH, NIST, OSHA, Rocky 
Mountain Center for Law Enforcement, and state emergency m anagement agen­
cies.
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Attendees agreed that the NDPO’s role will provide a great service i f  input from the 
end users is obtained and used in this early stage of planning domestic preparedness.
O th e r perceived issues and spec ia l concerns?
Attendees expressed a concern th a t information being provided through the 
Domestic Preparedness Program and other agencies is not complete due to the 
military’s security classification. In some instances the information obtained is 
conflicting. Thus, responders lack confidence in the information they are obtain­
ing. To minimize the num ber of casualties through direct exposure, contamination 
transfer, or panic, an Incident Commander needs complete and accurate informa­
tion.
Standards for additional PPE protection levels are needed beyond those currently 
available for ju s t level A protection. A systems approach is preferable and should 
consist of a matrix which defines the level of protective equipment (suit, respira­
tors, gloves) needed in each responder location at an incident scene. Criteria to 
identify hazard levels need to be determined in terms of exposure limits based on 
an assessm ent of the toxin and its concentration and method of dispersion.
Without the ability to determine the mode of dispersion, first responders and 
public officials will be unable to estimate the extent of exposure; thus, appropriate 
response to affected populations will be delayed.
Concerns were also raised about potential hazards associated with the use of PPE 
by inexperienced responders, such as law enforcement and emergency medical 
personnel. Such equipment could offer a false sense of security in that these 
individuals may don the equipment and enter a contaminated area to initiate a 
rescue without considering whether their PPE will offer appropriate protection for 
the given hazard. Additionally, these professionals may not be adequately trained 
to m aintain their PPE in proper condition. It was pointed out, however, th a t the 
solution to selection, use, and maintenance issues can be accomplished with 
training. □
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S e s s i o n  # 2  
R e s p o n d e r s  a n d  T h e i r  R e s p i r a t o r y  P r o t e c t i o n  N e e d s
The purpose o f Session #2 was to identify responders and their function at a 
chemical and/or biological incident, to delineate their respiratory protection and other 
personal protective equipment needs, and to explore short and long-term solutions.
P le n a ry  P r e s e n ta t io n s  R e s p o n d e r s  a n d  T h e ir  R e s p ir a to ry  P r o te c t io n  N e e d s
F irst P resen tation : Jeffrey  O’Connell, CBRNC
Representing the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermea­
sures subgroup (CBRNC) of the Technical Support Working Group, Mr. O’Connell 
briefed the audience on the la tter’s mission and the current projects which apply 
to first responders. The CBRNC subgroup is actively working to bring simple, cost 
effective solutions to the end users that can be utilized for effective response to 
chemical and/or biological incidents. The CBRNC subgroup is the primary team 
th a t focuses on chemical and biological respiratory protection and currently 
represents three user groups: 1) technical responders (Bomb Squad, Technical 
Escort Units [TEU], Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force [CBIRF], Explo­
sive Ordinance Disposal [EOD], and Hazardous Material Units); 2) first responders 
(DOJ, FEMA); and 3) special users (DOE, DOJ, and Secret Service). These users 
are responsible for responding to terrorist threats which commonly consist of 
improvised explosive and/or dispersal devices in u rban  environments. Examples of 
current CBRNC programs include the Disposable Toxic Agent Protective Suit 
(DTAPS), First Responders Mask, EOD suits, and a new escape mask.
In Summary, Mr. O’Connell emphasized th a t standards for PPE certification need 
to be developed by the appropriate federal agencies. These standards should 
include a quantitative method of evaluating the protection afforded by the entire 
PPE ensemble and be flexible enough to accommodate new technology and designs 
which offer better protection than  is presently available.
Second P resen tation : Jo h n  Eversole, Chief, Chicago Fire D epartm ent
Chief Eversole, Chicago Fire Department and IAFC representative, targeted the 
needs of the first responder community when faced with a terrorist threat. He 
vividly described how these incidents are currently handled on US soil and what 
help is needed to ensure that local responders will be capable and ready to 
respond effectively. Equipment that meets standards prepared by appropriate 
experts m ust be available to address these needs. Even though a th reat may prove 
to be a hoax, each one m ust be treated as a real incident.
Chief Eversole was emphatic that tim e is  ru n n in g  sh o rt f o r  the n a tio n  to  
ensure th a t emergency response workers, who r is k  th e ir  own lives to  save
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the lives o f  others, are adequate ly p ro tec ted  fro m  te r ro r is t th.rea.ts. He
challenged Federal agencies, to “get out of their box,” and engage in this issue and 
to find unique and rapid solutions without getting tied up in bureaucracy and red 
tape. He closed with this thought: “Don’t pu t your head on your pillow at night if 
you’ve not worked hard enough to make it better.”
W o rk g ro u p  D is c u s s io n s  R e s p o n d e r s  a n d  T h e ir  R e s p ir a to ry  P r o te c t io n  N e e d s
W hich w orke rs  and responder groups need p ro te c tio n  du ring  a chem ica l 
a n d / o r biologica.l inc iden t?
All four workgroups agreed that any responder to a chemical and/or biological 
incident needs to be adequately protected and th a t the level of protection required 
may vary. Information dissemination should recognize th a t responders include a 
diverse set of occupations and services: local public safety workers (firefighters, 
police, HazMat, bomb squad, Emergency Medical Service [EMS]); local government 
specialty response (Department of Environmental Protection [DEP], Department of 
Highways [DOH], county emergency planning personnel, public health officials); 
local utility workers (electric, gas, water); state government specialty response 
(national guard, state emergency planning personnel, DER, public health officials); 
federal law enforcement personnel [FBI, ATF]); Public Health Service (PHS), DMAT, 
NMRT, DMORT; private clinics and hospital workers.
W hat k in d  o f  p ro tec tio n  is  needed?
Several attendees said, “the priority is to develop fast, accurate, user-friendly 
detector system s.” Detection equipment needs to have large buttons and readouts 
th a t can accommodate users in encapsulated suits. Protocols and procedures for 
response plans to an incident need to be developed at local levels so th a t all 
parties involved can be notified and have input. Everyone, from the first un its on 
scene to hospital emergency room personnel, m ust be aware of their role in 
managing and mitigating an incident.
The assum ption for a typical response is th a t the environment at an incident 
would be Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) and that the contami­
nant concentration would decrease with increased distance from the incident. 
Zone specific and/or task specific PPE, m ust be available. However, accurate 
detection equipment may not be available to establish the zones. Protection for 
rescue workers may differ from that required by local utility workers who provide 
ancillary functions: e.g., individuals entering the hot zone would require level A 
encapsulated suits and SCBA; utility workers and police several blo cks away may 
only need appropriate negative-pressure or powered-air purifying respirators 
(PAPR). Consideration m ust also be given to the level of protection needed at
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decontamination operations, crime scene investigations, and triage/treatm ent 
areas as well as hospitals.
Several attendees stated that users would prefer a single canister providing 
adequate protection from all agents of concern. Given today’s technology, this is 
not yet possible. A device capable of providing this type of protection would be 
large, cumbersome, and provide limited service time. PAPRs may not be the most 
practical choice if they are stored in vehicles, not properly maintained, and thus 
not functional when needed. Air-purifying respirators (APRs) may not be adequate 
because many of the chemical warfare agents have poor sensory warning proper­
ties. Either adequate end-of-service-life indicators or appropriate change-out 
schedules need to be developed, validated, and accepted. Many attendees noted 
th a t effective respiratory protection will need to afford multi-agent protection in 
the event that different agents are released simultaneously. Chemical interferences 
could ham per the ability of a cartridge/canister to work effectively.
Several other (non-respiratory) concerns were expressed about protective clothing 
items such as chemically resistant gloves and encapsulating suits. Currently no 
federal agency provides certification for such equipment. Attendees suggested that 
the ideal situation might be for NIOSH to provide leadership in the evaluation and 
certification of all PPE.
W hat a d d it io n a l in fo rm a tio n  (tra in in g , gu ide lines, regu la tions, etc.) is  
needed to  p ro te c t users and  how can i t  be p rov ided?
Workshop participants agreed th a t one agency needs to be responsible for collating 
information and making it available to the public. A short-term  solution may be as 
simple as m anufacturers providing selection guides and test data for their prod­
ucts so that authorities can make better selection decisions. The long-term 
solution is for NIOSH or another agency to certify PPE and devise a decision matrix 
to guide selection. Sources for this information may already exist in m anufac­
tu rer’s, military’s, DOJ’s, and other countries’ guidance documents. However, 
these sources would have to be willing to release the best available information in 
a readily understandable form, even though m uch of it may be classified or 
proprietary. Currently responders consult PPE m anufacturers for information on 
selection of equipment because they are the most knowledgeable about their own 
products. Thus, some participants thought m anufacturers should lead the way in 
providing information to the end user.
The majority of the workshop participants suggested that one agency needs to 
bring together all the municipal organizations identified previously (Page 8) to 
develop a standard or generic response protocol. After developing response plans, 
field exercises should be scheduled that include the participation of all response 
personnel. Several participants said first responders should be (nationally) 
required to either take refresher training or meet monthly minimum training 
requirements, such as those specified in OSHA 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regula­
tions) Part 1910.120. Some attendees suggested that training and information
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dissemination should be through FEMA’s National Fire Academy because the 
appropriate relationships and curriculum s already exist there. One participant 
suggested that all citizens of the country should have basic domestic preparedness 
training to promote a general level of awareness.
Who are the a u th o ritie s  needed to de fine user needs? Wha.tprogra.ms m ust 
be coo rd ina ted  to  b rin g  the a.u.thorities together?
The majority of the participants said that the u se r’s needs m ust be satisfied by 
whatever programs may be implemented; thus, the user community needs to be 
closely involved in this process. Others said that, while they understand the need 
for user involvement, users m ust understand it will be difficult to adm inister a 
national program th a t will perfectly fit every municipality’s needs. The first step in 
this process would be for a single agency to bring together all municipal organiza­
tions and user groups in order to establish and thoroughly define the needs. This 
may be a service that NDPO could provide, in conjunction with its Interagency 
Board for Standardization and Interoperability, which is an advisory board to the 
NDPO and consists of officials from local, state, and federal government organiza­
tions. The Board is commissioned by the Attorney General of the United States to 
ensure: standardization and interoperability of equipment; research and develop­
ment of advanced technologies to assist first responders at state and local levels; 
and the establishment and maintenance of a robust crisis and consequence 
m anagement capability (refer to Appendix E for a list of members). Concurrently, 
agencies such as NIOSH, NIST, and SBCCOM, with experience in standards and 
testing for PPE, could initiate efforts to create standards—that regulatory enforce­
ment agencies, such as OSHA, could accept and enforce—and certify PPE and 
detectors for use against identified threats.
Training programs need to be coordinated. Presently, basic training programs for 
firefighters, EMS personnel, HazMat personnel, and police exist but need to be 
modified to incorporate at least a basic awareness of the hazards associated with 
response to a suspect chemical and/or biological warfare agent release. Specialized 
domestic preparedness training is available for large cities from the SBCCOM 
Domestic Preparedness Office. Most participants suggested that one central 
agency, perhaps NDPO, should have control of the information provided in these 
training programs to insure that all potential responders receive the same basic 
information. The training materials need to be disseminated through the channels 
and authorities that have traditionally provided training (the National Fire Acad­
emy [NFA], FEMA, DOJ, OSHA, DOT).
In summary, NDPO has been established to facilitate and coordinate all efforts in 
training, information dissemination, and standards and policy development 
relating to response to terrorist incidents. The agencies traditionally responsible 
for providing training and technical support to responders, and which are re­
spected and “looked to” for this type of support, m ust remain involved with NDPO 
in this effort.
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W hat know ledge and p rog ra m  gaps exist? W hat a.re o ther perceived user 
p ro te c tio n  needs?
The largest program gap is to establish one agency th a t is responsible to consoli­
date data and references and keep track of who is doing what. Information m ust 
be accessible but not reveal confidential information that would be a detriment to 
national security. Another identified gap is the development of domestic response 
plans in the medical community. It was suggested that training delivered through 
CDC and medical societies would be beneficial.
Another identified gap involves incident communication and coordination from an 
incident command center. NIST’s Office of Law Enforcement Standards is currently 
working to standardize communications systems to ensure interoperability among 
responders that may be involved with an incident. Response guidelines and 
procedures m ust be developed which cover the legal rights and  authority that can 
be enforced by an Incident Commander (IC). This document should contain 
information about the Incident Commander’s authority to contain exposed victims 
and the procedures that he/she m ust follow. Attendees acknowledged the impor­
tance of these issues and agreed th a t these tasks would be difficult to manage 
during an attack due to the associated fear and lack of knowledge. General 
awareness training for the domestic population could help this situation.
Users need PPE they can rely on to provide protection from chemical and/or 
biological th reats and attendees said they would prefer to have a national endorse­
ment of such equipment, e.g., respirators would have a NIOSH approval label to 
show th a t the product had been evaluated and will offer a minimum level of 
protection. User-friendly detection equipment needs to be developed. Permissible 
Exposure Limits (PELs) and Assigned Protection Factors (APFs) need to be estab­
lished according to the level of risk th a t users are willing to assum e based on the 
short- and long-term health effects of low-level exposures. PPE selection guides 
need to be developed and endorsed by a centralized agency.
Other discussed needs were immunizations and vaccines: Should all first respond­
ers be immunized against the hazards for which vaccines exist? Are there enough 
vaccines stockpiled and can they be distributed fast enough if an incident were to 
take place?
In summary, standards need to be developed in order to ensure minimum qualifi­
cation for responder PPE protection. These standards m ust evaluate the perfor­
mance, quality, and reliability of such equipment to minimize failures in the field. 
Either NDPO or some other national authority m ust maintain a database of 
chemical and/or biological counter-terrorism  response information, as well as 
approved equipment lists, procedures, and database resources th a t could be easily 
accessed via a website and/or 800 number. Participants also expressed the need to 
develop user friendly resources (handbooks, CD’s, diskettes, etc.) that can be 
disseminated to dispatch centers, hospitals, and portable incident command 
centers. □
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S e s s i o n  # 3  
R e s p i r a t o r  S t a n d a r d s  f o r  C h e m i c a l  a n d / o r  B i o l o g i c a l  
I n c i d e n t  R e s p o n s e s
The purpose o f Session #3 was to determine standards fo r respirators utilized fo r  
response to chemical and/or biological incidents and to discuss standards, quality 
assurance, and test procedures that are currently used by military and private 
laboratories.
P le n a ry  P r e s e n ta t io n s  R e s p i r a to r  S ta n d a r d s  fo r  C h e m ic a l  a n d /o r  
B io lo g ic a l I n c id e n t  R e s p o n s e s
F irs t P resentation : Paul G ardner, US Army, SBCCOM
Mr. Gardner briefed workshop attendees on the protective equipment testing 
programs used by the military to evaluate PPE for military and civilian applications 
against chemical an d /o r biological warfare agents. The SBCCOM has extensive 
expertise in the research, development, and test and evaluation of chemical and/or 
biological detection, decontamination, collective protection, and personal protec­
tion equipment. At the Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC), some 
assessm ents have been performed on a variety of commercial respirators and 
protective clothing, including both system and components level tests against 
agents. Examples of completed component level testing include liquid/vapor 
permeation, filter gas-life, and filter aerosol efficiency testing.
Both corn oil aerosol and Man-in-Simulant-Test (MIST) protection factor [PF] 
testing is performed to quantitatively assess the protection afforded by respirators 
and clothing ensemble systems in a simulated operational environment. Headform 
test apparatus, equipped with a breathing pump, is used to test system level 
performance of respirators against chemical agents such as sarin, m ustard gas, 
cyanogen chloride, and nerve agent sim ulants. A wide variety of capabilities are 
available to evaluate the physiological e ffects of respirator wear on hum an perfor­
mance.
In summary, SBCCOM possesses unique capabilities in chemical and/or biological 
related areas with extensive experience in the test and evaluation of both military 
and commercial PPE. The lack of standardized test procedures and criteria 
precludes qualification of respirators for civilian applications. A review of existing 
military and industrial standards, in conjunction with a thorough analysis of 
available th reat data, will be required in order to establish suitable test procedures 
and test criteria for a national biological and chemical equipment standard.
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Second Presentation: Ja c k  C. Sawicki, GEOMET Technologies, Inc.
Mr. Sawicki briefed the workshop on selection and test requirements for respira­
tors. Chemical and/or biological counter-terrorism  operations require a coordi­
nated response from many responders who will utilize diverse types of respirators. 
To ensure safety, each respirator will require analysis and testing. Several factors 
m ust be taken into account: respiratory protection factors, chemical resistance of 
materials, filtration requirements for the range of exposures, training require­
m ents, physical requirements, risk factors, and life cycle costs. PPE selection and 
test requirements m ust be directly related to risk assessment. Without real-time 
monitoring in place, and without an adequate threat and risk analysis, users 
would be required to wear level A system s for the duration of an incident. In an 
attack as large as the World Trade Center, there would not be enough air cylinders 
to support such an operation; therefore, another type of respirator is needed. Only 
those in the immediate release area should be required to wear an SCBA.
Mr. Sawicki believes th a t NIOSH can quickly develop air-purifying respirator 
standards, with assistance from SBCCOM, under the current regulations in 42 
CFR, Part 84. Factors that need to be considered in a respirator certification 
program include: determining appropriate test agents and concentrations, respira­
tor protection factors, and chemical permeation resistance of materials. A determi­
nation m ust be made regarding testing by live agents or sim ulants. He hopes it will 
be possible for NIOSH and the Army to develop and test respirators to reasonable 
criteria and produce data that will allow responders to make appropriate selection 
decisions.
W o rk g ro u p  D is c u s s io n s  R e s p i r a to r  S ta n d a r d s  fo r  C h e m ic a l  a n d /o r  
B io lo g ic a l In c id e n t  R e s p o n s e s
W hat sp e c ia /sp e c ific  s tan da rds  are a p p ro p ria te  f o r  chem ica l and /o r 
b io lo g ica l inc iden ts  in  term s o f  qu.a.lity, performa.nce, and re lia b ility ?
The initial step in determining standards for equipment is the characterization of a 
chemical or biological threat. For a terrorist attack, this characterization process 
entails determining what agents could be used, sustainable maximum concentra­
tions, and concentration versus time profiles. Once potential agents have been 
identified and characterized, the most penetrating agent should be used for test 
challenge criteria in order to set respirator standards. It may be practical to use or 
simulate only the most penetrating agents for the test challenges instead of testing 
all of the possible agents.
Concerns were expressed that Army respirator standards developed under Army 
"acceptable risk" criteria—reportedly less th an  1% of the force requiring medical 
care (not 1% death), and less than 15% of the force showing signs of chemical 
effects, but not requiring medical care—would not translate well to civilian 
populations. There was uncertainty about what the phrase "acceptable risk"
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meant. SBCCOM representatives explained that anticipated military chemical 
and/or biological exposures on the battlefield are expected to be in open areas and 
may be at lower concentrations than might be found with a terrorist release in a 
confined space. Thus battlefield responders may not need SCBA, and in fact could 
not carry out a military battlefield mission using SCBA due to the size, weight, and 
re-supply needs.
The military's primary need is for a respirator that is light enough to allow comple­
tion of a mission and affords the required protection. Negative-pressure gas 
m asks, as designed for the military, provide this capability. The risk associated 
with the negative-pressure m ask under battlefield conditions is not with the 
functioning of the mask, bu t rather with maintaining a good facial fit under 
strenuous battlefield operations.
Knowing that 100% safety is an impractical requirement from a military perspec­
tive, an analysis was done to generate the minimum need in terms of winning a 
force-on-force battle. The analysis showed that the 1% casualty and 15% effects 
level would still allow mission success; therefore, the minimum standard was set 
at that point. Military masks function m uch better than  the minimum. This 
“acceptable risk” philosophy carries through many military situations. Warfare is 
an inherently dangerous environment (as is firefighting, police work, etc.). Neither 
the military nor the civilian community designs tanks, bullet proof vests, cars, or 
any other gear that provides 100% safety except at an extremely high penalty in 
cost or support (logistics). The current military m ask allows mission completion 
under high level chemical attack scenarios with minimal risk, bu t military repre­
sentatives emphasized that military respirators were designed for 100% mission 
completion using the respiratory capacity of a young healthy recruit and th a t the 
military does not have extensive data regarding an older civilian workforce.
Attendees discussed the need to consolidate current standards for chemical and/or 
biological respirator performance. The NFPA, military, and NIOSH all have their 
own standards for respiratory protection. A suggestion was made to merge the 
standards so they address user needs for all situations. Many attendees suggested 
that the diverse standards should be correlated and become a unified standard, 
using an established test procedure, wherever this can be achieved.
Newly developed standards need to be performance-based to allow flexibility for 
m anufacturers to meet user needs and implement new technologies. Distinctly 
different protocols may be needed for first responders and for civilians who are 
merely escaping from an incident. One attendee reported that the current 85 Lpm 
(liters per minute) flowrate test criterion has been known since WWI to be signifi­
cantly less than  the 200-300 Lpm respiratory peak flow dem ands commonly 
encountered in today’s workplaces. He suggested that as long as we are using 
current standard testing procedures, we will never know whether respirator filters 
are capable of maintaining adequate protection in emergency work situations.
There is a concern that extended periods in  storage degrades the performance of a 
facepiece and cartridge/canister. Some suggested solutions were to stam p a visible
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expiration date and storage instructions on these items or provide an end-of- 
service-life indicator.
Currently, NIOSH approved particulate filters, (N, R, and P 100 filters) have the 
capability to filter out biological agents. Although respirators can filter out biologi­
cal agents, face-seal leakage—which is affected by facial structure and facepiece 
models and sizes—is a significant problem. Factors such as beard growth, scars, 
and perspiration also affect fit and leakage. Small exposure levels to some biologi­
cal agents can cause infection; therefore, identification and standardization of 
respirator protection factors were considered critical. Many attendees acknowl­
edged the importance of developing and establishing a respirator fit-factor s tan ­
dard prior to testing respirators in order to determine an appropriate Protection 
Factor (PF).
It would be impractical for civilians in the escape category of an incident to 
undergo fit testing. Neck-dam PAPRs may be one solution for them  because the 
seal around the neck is easier to control than  face-seal leakage around a tight- 
fitting facepiece.
W hat re gu la to ry  o r p r iv a te  sector progra.ms are needed to  ensure effective  
com pliance w ith  s tanda rds?
There was general agreement that a certification program is required to assure the 
performance, reliability, and quality of chemical and/or biological respirators.
Some participants suggested employing third-party labs to independently perform 
the testing of chemical and/or biological protective equipment. However, this would 
require major investment, EPA compliance (disposal/exhaust), testing expertise, 
acceptable security, and the ability to take delivery of and handle extremely toxic 
agents. Most participants suggested that third-party, independent testing labora­
tories be employed as facilities providing test data to NIOSH. The Institute would 
review and evaluate the data before approval of the respirator is granted. In this 
situation, third-party laboratory qualification processes m ust consider program 
performance, standard operating procedures, and appropriate ISO laboratory 
standards. The military has successfully used third-party labs as their agents to 
perform testing for research and the Chemical Demilitarization Program. Concerns 
were expressed that there might not be enough business to attract commercial 
labs to develop capacity to do all the testing that NIOSH performs. The DOD and 
NIOSH would have to be involved with implementation of third-party test lab 
programs. Most participants agreed th a t NIOSH should take the lead in any 
qualification of third-party labs and development of test standards.
Some participants suggested that independent testing, certification, and issuance 
by a third-party laboratory might be an option for respirator approvals. Partici­
pants expressed the belief that third-party labs engaging in third-party certifica­
tion programs would need to be reimbursed by a Federal agency, or the m anufac­
turer, for the cost of testing and developing laboratory capabilities. Participants 
debated whether a third-party certification or a NIOSH certification should be
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required. An IAFF representative thought that PPE certification was too serious an 
issue to have a third-party laboratory certifying respirators. Inasm uch as NIOSH is 
the recognized certifying agency, certification should remain a government- 
performed activity.
For Chemical Warfare Agents (CWA), there are approximately eleven commercial 
labs as well as numerous surety agent facilities located at SBCCOM that can 
perform appropriate respirator and PPE testing. An SBCCOM representative 
suggested that SBCCOM at Edgewood perform the chemical testing, that West 
Desert Test Center (WDTC) at Dugway Proving Ground perform the biological 
testing, and that NIOSH monitor and certify the test procedures. SBCCOM 
representatives clarified that they certify labs for use of surety agents, but only to 
ensure th a t labs handle the agents correctly; the SBCCOM surety process does not 
certify the surety laboratory’s test procedures. An SBCCOM scientist expressed 
concerns that test agent “sim ulants to assess media penetration may be inade- 
quate....Sim ulants may not be stopped the same way as surety agents in the 
micropores in the charcoal....Simulants would be acceptable for development 
testing, but ultimately the respirator needs to be tested against live biological 
agents.”
Further discussion noted that because of the extremely toxic nature of some 
chemical or biological agents, and the high levels of protection required, a certify­
ing agency needs to evaluate the total protection afforded by an entire PPE 
ensemble. NIOSH does not currently have the authority or certification require­
ments to approve ensembles: the Institute only certifies respirators. One partici­
pan t suggested that a third-party certifying agency should use standards devel­
oped by NFPA because NFPA standards can be developed m uch faster than  a 
NIOSH regulation and can consider all the needs of the user. This point was 
disputed in light of the fact th a t several draft NFPA standards have been under 
review for years.
Most participants felt strongly that it is necessary to have auditing programs, 
operated by a consumer reporting-type organization or NIOSH, that randomly test 
and evaluate respirators off the shelf to assess for continued compliance after 
certification. NIOSH has conducted auditing programs for years under their Off- 
The-Shelf Product and Manufacturing Site Audit programs. Representatives from 
the Battelle Dugway Test Center and SBCCOM discussed how they perform similar 
testing to ensure the quality of military products. SBCCOM also discussed their 
testing under the Domestic Preparedness Program where limited commercial PPE 
has been tested with chemical and/or biological agents. SBCCOM data is available 
on the internet, bu t it is based on DOD test procedures which are “client specific” 
requirements. Therefore, the value of this data may be limited.
Do o th e r chem ical an d /o r b io log ica l p ro tec tive  technologies requ ire  p e rfo r­
mance, q u a lity , and re lia b i l i ty  sta.nd.ards?
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Most participants agreed that there need to be performance, reliability, and quality 
standards for the following technologies: protective clothing, detectors, chemical 
decontamination procedures, medical treatm ent, bomb detection, and assay tests 
for biological agents.
Some standards for Chemical Protective Clothing (CPC) were reported but no 
universal standard was identified. The military has specifications for their CPC, 
and the NFPA 1991 standard is available with optional standards for Chemical 
Weapons testing for level A suits. Discussions explored the question as to which 
standard constitutes a level A protection. A participant explained that there is an 
EPA standard  and an NFPA 1991 standard which identify level A protection, but 
these are not OSHA standards. NFPA has no oversight or quality checking au tho r­
ity. Level A is not a certification, it simply categorizes the hazard level at an 
incident. The NFPA standard specifies that an encapsulating suit m ust pass a 
positive pressure test and includes provisions for manufacturing-site audits and 
the possibility of different test levels or tiers: e.g., a “Level 1" approval means that 
the device has met some tests, a “Level 2" means that it has met more tests, and a 
“Level 3" m eans that it has met all tests.
Chemical and/or biological detectors need to be real-time instrum ents that can 
reliably identify agents. One problem with chemical and biological detectors is that 
current technologies cannot always detect very low concentrations of these agents 
and users need to be aware of an instrum ent’s lower limit detection capabilities. 
Biological agents are a significant concern because of inadequate on-site detection 
capabilities and participants agreed that better biological weapons detectors are 
needed. Chemical weapons detectors are much better than  biological weapon 
detectors and can identify the presence and concentration of multiple chemical 
agents in order to assess what level of protection is needed. However, for many 
highly toxic industrial chemical and chemical warfare agents, current detectors are 
not sensitive enough to measure lethal dose concentrations. Current detector 
standards are basically being determined by the limitations of the technology.
Decontamination (decon) is important in an attack. The individual performing a 
decon should know when an adequate decontamination level has been obtained, 
i.e., “How Clean is Clean”? When can a victim be transported and treated without 
creating a hazard for medical personnel? SBCCOM participants suggested that 
perhaps a hasty decon should be performed first and a thorough decon later, 
before a victim enters a hospital. SBCCOM has developed chemical permeation 
resistant, Deployable Medical Shelters th a t are under positive-pressure using 
filtered air. These shelters are intended to be used as mobile Army hospitals and 
contain an airlock area where casualties can undergo a thorough decontam ina­
tion. It was suggested these Deployable Medical Shelters be retained by Army 
Reserve Units or National Guard Units for rapid mobilization to process and decon 
casualties before they enter a main hospital. Most participants felt that contami­
nated clothing and equipment should be disposed of instead of decon processed 
because the latter may yield uncertain decon results. SBCCOM representatives 
noted th a t decontamination is an operations issue as well as a technical issue. An
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additional observation was th a t appropriate post-attack medical treatm ent should 
consider the administration of vaccines.
W hich consensus and re g u la to ry  a u th o ritie s  need to be invo lved in  assess­
ing  the effectiveness o f  resp ira to rs  and o the r p ro tec tive  equipm ent?
The following list of government, private, and consensus standard organizations 
were identified as serving an im portant role in setting PPE performance standards: 
NIOSH, DOD, DOJ, NFPA, OSHA, ANSI, NIST, IAFF, IAFC, PHS, the Industrial 
Safety Equipment Association (ISEA), the American Society for Testing and 
Materials (ASTM), and the National Register of Emergency Medical Technicians 
(NREMT). It was suggested that a few organizations take the lead and get input 
from the other listed organizations. Some attendees recommended that, to expe­
dite the process, NIOSH, DOD, and OSHA should write a draft performance 
chemical and/or biological respiratory certification standard. NIOSH and DOD 
have expertise in respiratory protection and DOD has a num ber of test protocols, 
as well as information on toxicity, particle size, and other characteristics of 
military chemical and/or biological agents. One participant suggested that a draft 
standard be provided to the responder community for a one m onth period of public 
review and comment. Most participants felt that NIOSH, having the oversight role, 
should be the organization that would reject or accept responders’ comments. 
Inasm uch as NIOSH does not have a standard, a draft chemical and/or biological 
respiratory performance standard could be used as the benchmark before going 
through the official rule-making process. Another approach, recommended by 
participants, was for NIOSH to use existing regulatory flexibility in 42 CFR Part 84. 
There are no requirements in 42 CFR Part 84 for challenging respirators against 
chemical and biological warfare agents; however, 42 CFR Part 84 provides the 
flexibility to add additional gases and vapors which are not listed in §84.110(b) 
&190(a).
The role of OSHA was discussed in this workgroup session. An OSHA technical 
representative stated, “We have always relied upon NIOSH for respirators, and we 
want to continue to do th a t.” OSHA and NIOSH acknowledge that they will need 
the user community to report incidents of known or suspected failure of respira­
tors. Participants asked what OSHA could do in terms of emergency rule-making? 
An OSHA representative stated that OSHA may be able to exhibit some flexibility 
through policy, variance, or other approaches short of rule-making.
SBCCOM representatives stated th a t SBCCOM, OSHA, and NIOSH can jointly 
define an operations plan to meet the need for appropriate respirator certification 
standards and seek funding from the NDPO or the OJP.
Participants asked SBCCOM and NIOSH representatives how the chemical and/or 
biological respiratory performance standards and use recommendations could be 
developed. An SBCCOM representative indicated th a t there are many variables 
and unknowns when developing respiratory standards against chemical and/or 
biological warfare agents in a civilian setting. In the industrial setting, most of the
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variables are known, e.g., hazards and their concentrations. In a terrorist incident, 
however, there are numerous unknowns which make it difficult to determine what 
class of respirator is needed to provide adequate protection. The most probable 
and extreme terrorism scenarios could be used to define minimum performance 
standards. Collaboration from the emergency responder community, m anufactur­
ers, and government enforcement agencies is needed.
Many manufactures have guidelines on selecting respirators for workers. It was 
suggested that NIOSH provide a decision logic for chemical and/or biological 
respirators. There was general agreement th a t most respirator guidelines should 
be set for a given contaminated zone; e.g., a SCBA would be suggested when the 
contam inant or its concentration is unknown. An SBCCOM representative re­
marked that exposure limits can be defined for m anufacturers and chemical 
demilitarization plants. The Army identifies personal exposure limits as Airborne 
Exposure Limits (AEL). But some AEL concentration levels are below the range for 
many detectors. Accurate detection and monitoring to define exposure levels m ust 
be done if it’s desirable to select respirators with lower levels of protection, such as 
negative-pressure respirators.
W hat o th e r issues p e r ta in  to  respira.tors o r o ther p ro tective  technologies?
A major consideration, by attendees, for a chemical and/or biological respirator 
certification program was cost. In particular, high costs related to establishing 
laboratory capabilities may preclude private laboratories from participating, thus 
potentially limiting participation from non-governmental test facilities. Too few 
laboratory test facilities may delay the certification of innovative products and 
protection needed by responders. Other concerns were that private “for profit” test 
facilities may try to reduce costs by using substandard equipment, or that 
m anufacturers may choose a lenient private test agency to ensure that their 
products will pass the new standards.
Other concerns noted by attendees were: laboratory setup and evaluation time, 
responder training, cost of protection equipment, responder commitment to a 
comprehensive respirator protection program, and the role of volunteer fire 
departm ents and emergency medical services.
A m anufacturer of Self-Contained Self-Rescuers (SCSR) provided a brief overview 
on SCSR devices used by mineworkers to escape from a mine during an emergency 
and suggested that th is technology would be suitable for escape from a chemical 
and/or biological incident. Other participants said that there are some instances in 
which air-purifying respirators could be appropriately utilized during a terrorist 
attack. Combination approvals such  as SCBA with chemical cartridge respirators 
are another option reportedly being considered by some responders. A num ber of 
workgroup participants felt that there had not been enough consideration given to 
closed-circuit equipment in general and to protecting the general public in escape 
situations. It was suggested th a t certification standards should include protection 
for the public and not ju s t responders. □
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S e s s i o n  # 4
C h e m i c a l  a n d / o r  B i o l o g i c a l  R e s p o n s e  P l a n s :  
P u b l i c  H e a l t h  a n d  M e d i c a l  C o m m u n i t y  C o n c e r n s
The purpose o f Session #4 was to determine public health and medical community 
concerns which must be considered in developing an incident response plan; to 
identfy  public health and medical responders’ unique respiratory protection needs; 
and to identify any existing programs that would assist in these efforts.
P le n a ry  P r e s e n ta t io n  C h e m ic a l a n d /o r  B io lo g ica l R e s p o n s e  P la n s : P u b lic  H e a lth  a n d  M ed ica l C o m m u n ity  C o n c e rn s
Plenary P resen tation : Sam uel Benson, NYC, OEM
Mr. Benson, Project Manager for Health and Human Services at the New York City 
Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM), outlined the unique, and 
situation-specific, protection concerns for public health and medical support 
personnel involved in treating victims from chemical and/or biological terrorist 
attacks. New York City has been aggressively preparing to respond to the conse­
quences of WMD. The City started with a comprehensive analysis of the threat and 
resources and performed an in-depth analysis on: the emergency response system, 
the health care system, and the infrastructure. On the basis of the analysis, a 
number of protection initiatives relating to training, equipment, and exercises were 
undertaken. New York City also worked with federal agencies to develop a better 
understanding of how federal assets could be used most effectively to facilitate 
research and development, intelligence, response support, and logistics.
Mr. Benson briefed the audience on the tremendous effort that is required to 
organize and activate the different occupations and resources needed to cope with 
a terrorist attack. He addressed the logistics associated with each of the obvious 
responding groups, e.g., firefighters, Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs), 
police, ambulance drivers, hospital security, doctors, and nurses. New York City 
recognized that the workers in the subways, transportation systems, communica­
tion, and sanitation departm ents m ust also be considered in the response plan. 
Key elements for logistical requirements are PPE, antidote kits, decontamination 
stations, and detectors. Better PPE and detectors need to be developed; however, 
the design and operation of this equipment should take into account the duties 
that will be performed by the user. In closing, he explained that a chemical attack 
and a biological attack should be treated differently and that the civilian approach 
is distinct from a military chemical and/or biological model in mission and equip­
ment.
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W o rk g ro u p  D is c u s s io n s  C h e m ic a l a n d /o r  B io lo g ica l R e s p o n s e  P la n s : P u b lic  H e a lth  a n d  M ed ica l C o m m u n ity  C o n c e rn s
W hat personnel comprise the p o te n tia lly  exposed m ed ica l and p u b lic  h e a lth  
response com m unity bo th  on-site and  o ffs ite?
Participants noted that, the police, firefighters, and EMT initial responders will be 
potentially exposed to chemical and/or biological agents from an attack. Secondary 
personnel who may be potentially exposed are doctors, nurses, ambulance drivers, 
laboratory technicians, hospital security guards, Red Cross volunteers, industrial 
hygienists, and morticians. Many of the civilian casualties will self evacuate from a 
terrorist attack area and may, thereby, contaminate other personnel.
A biological attack dominated the discussion on this question. Mr. Benson 
recommended separating biological incidents from chemical incidents: they should 
be addressed and treated differently. Decontamination is needed in a chemical 
incident bu t is not needed in a biological attack in most cases. If individuals had a 
biological agent on their bodies or clothes, they would need to be decontaminated, 
but decontamination would not need to be applied to a person who was simply 
downwind of a release.
Attendees raised many additional questions which need to be answered: What are 
the infectious challenges needed to inflict a casualty? What is the risk of re- 
entrainm ent of spores from clothing? Do we know whether an aerosolized biologi­
cal agent needs to be decontaminated, particularly if found in a disseminating 
device such as a ventilation system? Can victims re-aerosolize enough biological 
spores to generate a second exposure victim (e.g., medical staff) or otherwise 
spread the agent?
Other discussions explored: Where should personnel be masked? Where should 
isolation of contaminated victims take place? How should a health care facility be 
informed about characteristics of the agent involved and appropriate treatm ent 
precautions?
W hat spec ia l considera tions m ust be addressed in  developing re sp ira to ry  
pro tec tive  ensembles f o r  the m edica l and p u b lic  hea lth  com m unity?
Most participants agreed that different exposure levels at chemical and/or biologi­
cal attacks will w arrant different levels of protection. Medical and public health 
community professions th a t may require personal protective equipment when 
treating terrorist victims are: EMTs, decontamination personnel, ambulance 
drivers, hospital security, orderlies, doctors, and nurses. Careful consideration 
should be given to the selection of respirators for doctors and nurses who will be 
treating victims in the emergency and recovery rooms.
Respiratory Protection Workshop January 03, 2000 -  Page 21
Medical personnel and the health community representatives requested guidance 
as to which respirator or level of protection is required based on a given exposure 
or threat. Many participants felt th a t respirators for doctors and nurses should 
require little to no training and maintenance, be one-size-fits-all, easy to use, non­
threatening to patients, and be able to accommodate a variety of personnel with 
beards, long hair, glasses, and diverse facial sizes and disfigurations. Samuel 
Benson added that the entire medical community needs a respirator with which a 
user doesn’t have to be fit-tested, is easy to don, has good visibility, and is com­
fortable enough for extended periods of wear. Other considerations noted for 
medical respirators were the need to interface with medical equipment, have some 
form of communication capabilities, and be able to w ithstand long periods of 
storage.
A full-face view respirator was reported to be less threatening to a patient than  a 
respirator where only a doctor’s eyes can be seen and also benefits hearing 
impaired patients by allowing them  to read a doctor’s lips. Another suggested 
solution was the neck-dam PAPR because the seal around the neck (and leakage 
through it) is reportedly easier to control than  face seal leakage around a tight- 
fitting facepiece.
By the time doctors and nurses treat victims in a hospital, the victims should have 
undergone decontamination; therefore, the level of protection required should be 
lower than  it was for an EMT who was first on-site before any decontamination 
took place.
Several participants, who were involved with developing municipal response plans, 
discussed the problem of how to change the mind-set of the medical community 
personnel who commonly do not wear respirators and are not trained in PPE. A 
m anufacturer stated th a t the problem is not the respirators, but rather the 
motivation of the people to use them. He further stated that standards need to be 
changed to allow new devices to be developed, because the standards that are 
used today were based upon the work that was done in the 1940's.
An SBCCOM participant suggested that the Israeli government should be con­
sulted because its military researchers developed and employed m asks with good 
visibility in preparation for chemical and/or biological attacks.
W hat p rogram s, governm ent o r p riva te , are cha rac te riz ing  exposures and  
recom m ending con tro ls  f o r  c iv ilia n s?
Many governmental organizations reportedly have field and research data charac­
terizing exposures. The DOD has groups working on chemical and biological 
exposure issues and has defined, and is defining, exposure limits through the 
Chemical Demilitarization Program.1 The CDC developed recommendations for 
particular exposures, and the Army is revising these for the Chemical Demilitariza­
1 “ F ina l R ecom m end ation  fo r P ro tec ting  th e  H ealth  and  Safety A gainst P o ten tia l A d v erse  E ffects o f  
L ong-T erm  E xposure  to Low  D oses o f  A gents: GA, GB, VX , M usta rd  A g en t (H, HD, T), and  L ew isite (L ).” 
F edera l R eg is ter , 53 (15 M arch  1988):8540-8507 .
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tion Facilities (CDF). A Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program 
(CSEPP) did focus on exposures to civilians outside the CDFs and recommended 
PPE for responders who would be evacuating civilians. As a result of CSEPP, a 
great deal of data was generated on potential civilian exposures. The DOD is 
setting guidelines on exposure limits and consults with the National Research 
Council and National Academy of Sciences to enhance the credibility of the limits 
(these are the CSEPP limits). The US Army Center for Health Promotion and 
Preventive Medicine (CHPPM) should have data on lower exposure limits: PPE 
standards cannot be established if they are based on a detector’s limitations which 
may only detect exposures that are higher than  the recommended exposure limits. 
Other organizations in the government th a t can assist with characterizing expo­
sure limits are OSHA, EPA, and CDC. OSHA has exposure information on toxic 
industrial materials and EPA provides some exposure information from its Office of 
Risk Assessment. The CDC has a standard for tuberculosis, bu t not for other 
biological agents. A hazard ratio that relates a toxic agent’s environmental concen­
tration to the agent’s recommended exposure limits, as in the NIOSH hazard 
assessm ent model, could be used to select PPE with a equal or higher PF, bu t 
documentation of PF should be evaluated to assure the data is applicable for the 
intended use.
The following private organizations may have data on characterizing exposures for 
civilians: Battelle, American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists 
(ACGIH), Ja n e ’s Defense Review, and the National Library of Medicine Health and 
Science Data Base.
Multiple participants noted that one problem with establishing PPE standards is 
th a t for many terrorist warfare agents, current detectors can only detect exposures 
that are higher than  the recommended exposure limits.
Organizations th a t are recommending control policies and medical equipment for 
civilians are DOD, FEMA, CDC, DOT, NFPA, and OSHA. The DOD is working on 
warning systems for buildings; it has established procedures for isolation and 
decontamination of personnel, and it has mobile Deployable Medical Shelters 
available. The DOD representative stated that chemical decontamination is 
available as a sheltered airborne drop un it and perhaps the National Guard could 
m aintain and supply these units to local areas. USAMRIID uses casualty bags to 
transfer patients. DOD has both policies and equipment to accommodate casual­
ties that would be needed to control contamination during all phases of treatm ent. 
FEMA is working with cities to have emergency response plans in place wherein 
smaller communities would be linked to larger cities. The CDC representatives 
reported th a t the CDC is developing rapid verification, vaccination, and treatm ent 
guidance and support systems. The Department of Transportation (DOT) has 
m andated responsibilities for the transportation of hazardous materials and 
controls national policy covering the transportation of chemical and biological 
samples.
Participants suggested that other countries such as Israel and Sweden should be 
consulted to help u s evaluate, and perhaps adopt, some of their emergency 
response procedures pertaining to chemical and/or biological attacks.
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W hat p rogram s a.re w ill in g  and able to cha.racterize exposures and recom­
mend con tro ls  f o r  the m edica l and p u b lic  hea lth  com m unity?
All the workgroups agreed th a t the medical community should first contact the 
CDC for information when faced with either a chemical or a biological incident. 
Some participants suggested that the CDC, USAMRIID, ACGIH, SBCCOM’s 
Technical Escort, US Society of Toxicology, Health Science Centers throughout the 
country, and other national groups need to devise a nationally recognized plan for 
identifying and responding to a terrorist attack. Clear information was requested 
to guide decisions about vaccinations, post-exposure prophylaxis, etc., for re­
sponders and victims.
All groups felt that the re is a great deal of medical and industrial hygiene informa­
tion available about exposure limits, infectious diseases, toxicology, and probable 
chemical and/or biological terrorist warfare agents that can be compiled and 
contribute to a national response plan.
To qualify under the NDPO grants program, many city planners, local health 
organizations, and Emergency Response Offices are currently preparing response 
plans and needs assessm ents for a terrorist attack. These entities have multiple 
questions and need resources to help develop responsible plans and identify 
appropriate equipment. Some of their questions are: what type of PPE should be 
issued to first responders and medical staff after a chemical and/or biological 
attack? How long m ust the municipality sustain the response before he lp can 
arrive? What type of medical and public health help will be required and will 
hospitalization and treatm ent systems be capable of handling the demands? Will 
the Directorate of Military Support (DOMS) be able to provide support to civilian 
programs and to what magnitude? Whose job would it be to assess hospital 
readiness for a chemical and/or biological attack?
To help address city officials’ concerns, participants suggested the following 
information resources to help assess what is practical: CDC, NDPO, DOD Domes­
tic Preparedness Training Office, IAFF, IAFC, IAPC, NIOSH, National Volunteer Fire 
Council, NIST, OSHA, city planners, Law Enforcement-FBI, and medical speciality 
societies.
Some participants challenged NIOSH to work with groups such as the National 
Center for Infectious Diseases (NCID), USAMRIID, PPE manufacturers, and other 
pertinent organizations to come up with a formal response to NYC-OEM questions 
which were presented in Session #4, at this workshop. □
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C O N C L U S I O N S  a n d  S U G G E S T E D  A C T I V I T I E S
C o n c lu s io n s
This workshop provided attendees ample opportunity to learn about the roles of 
governmental and private-sector groups involved in protecting emergency respond­
ers against chemical and/or biological terrorist incidents. Participants explored 
four issues: hazards associated with an incident, responders and their respiratory 
protection needs, respirator standards for incident responses, and incident 
response plans addressing medical and public health concerns associated with 
incidents. The following conclusions serve only to highlight the many protection 
issues and suggestions raised.
Chief John  Eversol made everyone aware that appropriate equipment and guide­
lines covering all PPE issues are needed for the emergency responder community 
now. The Chief was joined by other attendees at the workshop in urging NIOSH to 
exercise whatever regulatory flexibility it possesses to test, certify, and approve 
respirators for chemical anc/or biological warfare agents and toxic industrial 
materials as quickly as possible.
Officers from municipal fire fighter companies were joined by IAFC, IAFF, and 
NFPA representatives in requesting NIOSH collaboration with SBCCOM to ensure 
th a t NIOSH/NFPA-approved SCBA will survive an exposure to chemical warfare 
agents and th a t critical components will not be degraded. The merging of NIOSH 
and SBCCOM respirator design, performance, quality assurance, and reliability 
standards was considered by some attendees as a good approach to provide a 
national chemical and/or biological respirator certification program. NIOSH and 
SBCCOM are developing a program of joint activities to address the issues, raised 
during the workshop, associated with establishing respirator standards for 
protection against chemical and/or biological threats. The ability of this program to 
develop standards will depend upon the availability of funding. The following 
activities are considered essential to support a respirator certification program: 
establishment of a chemical and biological equipment database, respiratory 
equipment materials survival analysis, weapon agent and industrial chemical 
cartridge and canister test criteria development, threat scenario vulnerability 
assessm ent, and user guidelines development.
Some attendees requested guidance from the sponsoring agencies on how to 
provide NIOSH-certified APRs or PAPRs and military alternatives to SCBA for 
th rea t scenarios where contam inant concentrations appropriately dictate a lesser 
level of respiratory protection. Some attendees also requested NIOSH input into 
national domestic preparedness training programs and the development of 
detector technologies.
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Additional respiratory protection-related issues were requests to develop: protec­
tion factor protocols, valid APF methodologies, and respirator selection decision 
logic for chemical and/or biological threat scenarios.
There was general agreement that guidelines covering all PPE issues m ust be 
developed as soon as possible using the best available knowledge. Contributing 
agencies should then periodically review their research and investigation findings 
and update the guidelines as needed. □
S u g g e s te d  Follow -U p A c tiv i t ie s
As requested, the conference sponsors have prepared and distributed this Work­
shop Report.
NIOSH and SBCCOM will continue to work with the DOD-DOJ Interagency Board 
for Equipment Standardization to understand the issues related to standards and 
qualification requirements for responder equipment.
NIOSH will collaborate with the DOD, SBCCOM, NFPA, and all interested parties 
to answer the issues raised about certified SCBA for use against chemical and/or 
biological threats.
Research is needed to address many of the concerns discussed by workshop 
attendees, e.g., responders need a respirator that is protective but which creates 
the least am ount of physiological burden; respirator materials must w ithstand any 
permeation and penetration of chemical and/or biological agents, etc.
The sponsors will continue to work with other agencies to explore partnerships 
and areas of possible collaboration, specifically with regard to topics discussed 
during the workshop including: respirator standards and tests, guidance docu­
ments, and chemical and biological exposure information.
Coordination efforts should include data sharing. A great deal of information has 
military security classification. This information needs to be considered in estab­
lishing protection recommendations for responders and for answering the many 
unansw ered questions raised during this workshop. One agency or group of 
agencies should work to get information in a readily available format for all who 
need it, e.g., a printed list, a website with hot buttons, or a resource guide with 
phone num bers, etc. Workshop sponsors will endeavor to establish a list of 
available information relating to the topics addressed at this meeting and make 
the sources of the information available to interested parties.
The information gathered during this workshop will be used to revise and upgrade 
agency plans for addressing respirator standards and options for respirator 
evaluations. Those who attended this workshop and future readers of this report 
should use it to gain a better understanding of the myriad issues associated with 
respiratory protection for emergency responders. □
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A P P E N D I X  A
P l e n a r y  S p e a k e r  A b s t r a c t s  a n d  B i o g r a p h i e s
By o rde r o f  p resen ta tion :
Mr. Jam es A. Genovese 
Mr. Andrew Bringuel II 
Mr. Jeffery  O’Connell 
Chief Jo h n  Eversole 
Mr. Paul Gardner 
Mr. Ja c k  C. Sawicki 
Mr. Sam uel Benson
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Jam es A. Genovese 
Team Leader: Chemical/Biological Counterterrorism Team 
US Army’s Soldier Biological Chemical Command (US SBCCOM)
Mr. Jam es A. Genovese has served as a team leader of the Chemical/Biological 
Counterterrorism Team at the US Army’s Soldier Biological Chemical Command 
(USA SBCCOM) since 1991. From 1982 to 1991, he managed multiple chemical 
weapons projects under the Army’s Retaliatory Chemical Munitions Program. He is 
recognized as a national and international expert on chemical/biological terrorism 
and is a former chair of national and international working groups dealing with 
technical response to CB incidents. He also serves as a technical consultant and 
part-tim e hazardous materials instructor for the government’s Domestic 
Preparedness Program.
ABSTRACT
Response to Chemical/Biological (CB) Incidents: Sizing up the Hazards
Effective response to chemical/biological incidents will require proactive 
integration of both response sectors of our government—military and civilian. This 
integrated framework should optimize response mission effectiveness and 
minimize the casualties to all emergency responders at any level of government. A 
variety of toxic materials could be utilized by the non-conventional terrorist 
including both chemical and biological agents. Toxic industrial chemicals, as well 
as military-unique CB hazards may pose unique challenges to our current systems 
of individual protection. Because our incident responders could be confronted with 
such a broad spectrum of hazards: chemical or biological; very toxic to mildly 
toxic; interior vs. exterior events, etc., it is param ount that we approach these 
response issues from a system s perspective.
With regard to protective posture, operations and technology need to be 
thoroughly ingrained in this process. Three interrelated factors should become the 
focus for future developments: The external environment (The WORLD), which 
includes the range of hazards responders may experience. The protective ensemble 
(The BARRIER), which involves the continuing assessm ent of protective system 
capabilities including protection factors, logistics, and others. The internal 
environment (YOU) that assesses the physiological effects of the responder in 
specific ensembles in specific operational scenarios.
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Andrew (Andy) Bringuel, II 
FBI National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO)
Andrew Bringuel, II attended Mercer University in Atlanta and graduated from 
Saint Leo College with a degree in Criminal Justice. He entered duty with the FBI, 
February 05, 1990, and was assigned to the Birmingham Field Office’s, White 
Collar squad where he specialized in Public Corruption, Bank Fraud, and 
Environmental Investigations. On October 01, 1996, Andy was assigned to the 
Foreign Counter-Intelligence squad working on a num ber of th reat issues and co­
ordinating the Awareness of National Issues and  Response program as well as 
Birmingham’s computer intrusion investigative team. He also served as a 
surveillance team coordinator, crisis negotiator, and media representative for the 
FBI. October 29, 1998, Andy was promoted to a supervisory position within the 
National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO) and reported for duty, February 22, 
1999.
ABSTRACT
Overview: National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO)
The NDPO is an interagency effort to enhance coordination among federal 
programs offering terrorism preparedness assistance to sta te and local 
communities. The NDPO will become the clearinghouse for all weapons of m ass 
destruction (WMD) related issues and is organized into the following programs: 
planning, exercises, equipment, information dissemination, and health issues. The 
NDPO will serve as a single program and policy coordination office for domestic 
preparedness programs for state and local communities.
The NDPO will continue to assist community stakeholders as well as participating 
state, local, and federal partners in a diligent effort to prevent, prepare, and 
respond to acts of terrorism  involving the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Respiratory Protection Workshop January 03, 2000 -  Page 30
Jeffrey D. O’Connell 
Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Countermeasures 
Battelle Memorial Institute
Tracy Cronin of the US Navy Office of Special Technology Technical Support 
Working Group was invited to speak at this workshop. Due to previous 
commitments, she was unable to attend and asked Jeffrey O’Connell to appear 
and address the workshop participants on the subject of first responder needs.
Jeffrey O’Connell graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1986, was 
commissioned in the Navy, and immediately reported to the Surface Warfare 
Officer School and the USS Rentz (FFG-46) in San Diego. Onboard the Rentz, he 
was assigned as Auxiliaries Officer, Ship Intelligence Officer, Combat Information 
Officer, and Operations Officer. During his assignment on the Rentz, he completed 
two deployments to the Persian Gulf including Operation Earnest Will and Praying 
Mantis. After his sea duty, he served as a Joint Chief of Staff Intern, acting as an 
action officer for the Nuclear/Chemical command and control systems, and was 
then assigned to the Chief of Naval Operations Office responsible for training 
requirem ents for Undersea Warfare. In 1991, Jeffrey resigned his commission and 
entered the naval reserves. He is currently assigned to the Chief of Naval 
Operations conducting assessm ents on the Navy’s Science and Technology 
Programs.
Since 1992, Mr. O’Connell has been employed by Battelle Memorial Institute 
primarily working on Chemical/Biological Defense Programs. He has participated 
on the development of over 20 chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) 
defensive programs including: Joint Service Integrated Light-weight Suit 
Technology (JSLIST), Jo in t Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS), Improved 
Chemical Agent Point Detection System (IPDS), Shipboard Collective Protection 
System (CPS), and Jo in t Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector 
(JSLSCAD). He has been instrum ental in implementing the Joint Field Trials for 
evaluating detectors for biological warfare agent detection conducted annually at 
Dugway Proving Ground. His current assignm ent is to support the Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Subgroup of the Technical Support Working 
Group.
ABSTRACT
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures (CBRNC) 
Subgroup Briefing: Technical Support Working Group (TSWG)
The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) was formed in 1986 as a result of 
Vice President B ush’s Task Force recommendations to develop an interagency 
working group for combating terrorism. TSWG’s mission is to conduct a national 
Interagency research and development (R&D) program for combating terrorism 
through rapid research, development, and prototyping. The main objectives
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include: providing an interagency forum to coordinate R&D requirem ents for 
combating terrorism; sponsoring R&D not addressed by individual agencies; 
promoting information transfer, dual use, and commercialization; and providing a 
fast track and flexible program. The program guides development through 
Intelligence Community assessm ents of the terrorist threat and technical 
capabilities, user requirements, subgroup capabilities, and special studies. Users 
groups include the Departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), State (DOS), 
Commerce (DOC), Justice (DOJ), Transportation (DOT), Treasury, Health and 
Human Services (HH S), Central Intellige nce Agency (CIA), Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, and United States Postal Service. The primary subgroup 
th a t focuses on chemical and biological respiratory protection is the Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures (CBRNC) Subgroup.
The CBRNC Subgroup has three main user types: Technical Responders—Bomb 
Squad, Technical Escort Units (TEU), Chemical/Biological Incident Response 
Force (CBIRF), Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD), and Hazardous Material 
Units); First Responders—DOJ, FEMA; and special u sers—DOE, DOS, and Secret 
Service. These users are responsible for responding to terrorist threat devices, 
which commonly are improvised explosive and/or dispersal devices in urban 
environments.
TSWG CBRNC projects are divided into the following areas: detection and 
identification, protection, decontamination, and mitigation and containment. The 
TSWG CBRNC Subgroup meets about three times a year to review the current 
threat, validate on-going projects, provide a new requirem ent/needs list, and 
select and fund technologies for rapid prototyping.
Examples of current CBRNC programs include the Disposable Toxic Agent 
Protective Suit (DTAPS), First Responders Mask, CB EOD Suits, and a new Escape 
Mask. The DTAPS program develops low cost, disposable level A, B, and C 
protective suits with cooling for emergency response personnel (e.g., Emergency 
Medical Services, fire fighters, law enforcement, etc.). These suits were evaluated 
as a complete system with operational users. The suits are currently scheduled to 
be commercially available by Summer 1999. The First Responders Mask program 
is being developed to provide a quick donning respiratory protective system for 
military and civilian response team s in CB contaminated environments. The 
technical approach is to enhance an existing hood and blower configuration mask 
to allow normal operations for extended periods of time. The m ask will be 
subm itted to NIOSH for certification in 1999, and will be available through the 
GSA schedule. CB EOD Suits were developed to provide protection against 
chemical, biological and explosive threats. The suits were tested under varied 
environmental conditions to determine penetration resistance of high velocity 
droplets and vapor, integrity of materials in the presence of liquid 
agents/decontam ination products, and protection against vaporous, aerosolized or 
liquid hazards. The suit is currently in operational use and commercially available. 
The Escape Mask Program is being developed to provide a protective hooc/filter 
system th a t can last for 30 minutes which can be easily donned to escape from 
hazardous areas. The program evaluated commercial off-the-shelf products, and 
performed testing on a selected candidate. Test results were published, but due to
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lack of standards for determining escape mask effective ness results are 
inconclusive. Current efforts include m ask modifications and standards 
development.
CBRNC users have specific concerns with respect to chemical and biological 
respiratory protection. While current military systems provide adequate protection 
against the classic CB agents, the user community has a concern with the 
definition of performance specification against Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICS). 
These include:
•  Threat concentrations and dosages for terrorist incidents;
•  Evaluation of protection factor (PF) levels and capabilities of existing
personnel protective equipment (PPE);
•  Potential requirement of several different types of filter canisters and
imposing a reliance on detection systems for proper selection of protective 
equipment.
New respiratory protection systems need to: (a) provide extended wear; increased 
stay times, increased airflow rate/volume; minimized heat stress; reduced size and 
weight; an indication of protection time remaining; an expanded field of view—a 
minimum of 80% with a method of correcting vision; improved communications 
with respect to clarity, amplification, and hands free operation; and (b) be 
affordable; commercially available; compatible with existing PPE and special 
equipment, e.g., fire fighting equipment and night vision goggles; and 
m anufactured with state-of-the-art materials and design features.
The certification of PPE for non-military users responding to a terrorist incident 
needs to include the protection factor afforded by the entire system and a scaled 
protection level for chemical and/or biological and toxic industrial hazards 
(liquid/vapor/aerosols) similar to level A to C suits, and be flexible enough to 
integrate innovative designs, such as the neck dam concept used in the CB First 
Responders Mask. Standards for certification need to be developed by the 
appropriate agency.
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John  M. Eversole 
Hazardous Materials Coordinator 
Chief, Chicago Fire Department
Chief John  Eversole joined the Chicago Fire Departm ent in February, 1969 and 
has served on Engines, Hook and Ladders, and Squad Companies. He is a certified 
Master Instructor through the Office of the Illinois State Fire Marshal, as well as 
an instructor teaching Fire Science programs for the Chicago City Wide Colleges 
and the University of Illinois.
Chief Eversole has been involved in a number of special programs such as the 
Deep Tunnel Project and the Hazardous Incident Team (HIT). He has coordinated 
the development of the Confined Space/Collapse Rescue operations and has been 
working with the US Department of Defense in developing a civilian emergency 
response program for terrorism. At the present time, Chief Eversole serves as the 
Hazardous Materials Coordinator. Under this command he is responsible for the 
Hazardous Incident Team and coordinates all the Fire D epartm ent’s units that 
make up the Hazardous Incident Task Force.
Chief Eversole is Chairman of the Hazardous Materials Committee of the 
International Association of Fire Chiefs and Chairman of the Hazardous Materials 
Professional Competency Standards Committee of the National Fire Protection 
Association.
ABSTRACT 
The Role of The Emergency First Responder
Chief Eversole discussed the role of the emergency first responder to incidents 
involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). He described how local responders 
have traditionally met th e needs of their co mmunities and adapted traditio nal 
techniques to meet these new challenges. He emphasized that today every 
community is threatened by WMD and that even though most threats may prove 
to be a hoax, each m ust be handled as an actual incident. The nation m ust act 
quickly to ensure that local emergency response workers, who risk their own lives 
to save the lives of others, are adequately protected from WMD and adequately 
trained to mitigate potential incidents.
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Paul D. Gardner 
US Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center 
Respiratory and Collective Protection Team 
Research and Technology Directorate 
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
From 1982-83, Paul Gardner served as a NIOSH student intern, performing 
research studies to assess the aerosol collection efficiency of particulate respirator 
filters. In 1983, he accepted an engineering position with the US Army at the 
former Chemical Research and Development Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, 
MD, and for the past 15 years, he has been employed as an engineer with the US 
Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, formerly known as the Edgewood 
Research, Development and Engineering Center. As an established member of the 
Respiratory and Collective Protection Team, Research and Technology Directorate, 
Paul served as a principal engineer on a variety of projects involved with the 
design, development, and evaluation of respiratory protection equipment. Major 
responsibilities include identifying and evaluating new filtration technology, 
assessing respirator protection factor performance, investigating new respirator 
test methodologies, and developing novel respirator and filter design concepts for 
military and civilian applications. He serves as lead facilitator on several in-house 
and joint agency projects pertaining to the testing and evaluation of military and 
commercial personal protective equipment and assists in research studies to 
assess hum an performance factors and physiological stresses associated with 
respirator wear. He is a member of the American Industrial Hygiene Association 
and the International Society for Respiratory Protection.
ABSTRACT
Overview: SBCCOM Testing and Evaluation of CB-PPE for Civilian Applications
Mr. Gardner presented an overview of the type of testing performed by the US 
Army’s Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM) to evaluate personal 
protective equipment (PPE) for military and civilian applications requiring 
protection against chemical and biological (CB) warfare agents. SBCCOM has 
extensive expertise in the research, development, and test and evaluation of CB 
detection, decontamination, collective protection, and personal protection 
equipment. Numerous joint agency programs involving civilian CB-PPE 
applications have been supported by SBCCOM over the last several years. Among 
the major programs supported are the Chemical Stockpile Emergency 
Preparedness Program (CSEPP), Domestic Preparedness Program, and the 
Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) on counter terrorism.
At the Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC), SBCCOM, assessm ents have 
been performed on a variety of commercial respirators and protective clothing 
ensembles to characterize their performance against CB agents. These evaluations 
include both system and component level assessm ents. Examples of system level
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tests include aerosol and vapor protection factor, system agent penetration and 
permeation, and hum an performance testing. Examples of component level tests 
include liquid/vapor permeation (swatch testing), filter gas-life, and filter aerosol 
efficiency testing.
Protection factor (PF) testing is performed to quantitatively assess the protection 
afforded by respirators and clothing ensemble systems (e.g., chemical protective 
suits) in a simulated operational environment. In the aerosol PF test, a corn oil 
aerosol is used as the test challenge and an automated photometer system is used 
to measure the aerosol concentration inside the respirator or su it while the wearer 
undergoes an exercise routine representative of the use environment. The Man-In­
Simulant-Test (MIST) is another type of PF test used to determine the level of 
vapor protection afforded by clothing ensembles. The MIST uses methyl salicylate 
as a vapor challenge and passive samplers are affixed to different body locations to 
detect leakage. Using a body region hazard model, a whole body PF is calculated 
based on the individual local exposure levels (dosages) measured inside the suit.
To determine system level performance of respirators against actual chemical 
agents, a system test is conducted using a headform test apparatus equipped with 
a breathing simulator pump. Typical tes t challenges include sarin (GB), m ustard 
(HD), cyanogen chloride (CK) and the nerve agent sim ulant dimethyl 
methylphosphonate (DMMP). A m iniature chemical agent monitor system 
(MINICAMS) or a hydrogen flame emission detector (HYFED) is used to measure 
GB, DMMP, and HD agent concentration. Cyanogen chloride is typically m easured 
using a gas chromatograph (GC) equipped with a flame ionization detector.
Liquid/vapor permeation testing is performed to assess the chemical agent 
resistance of PPE materials and components. Commonly referred to as swatch 
testing, test samples from masks, clothing, gloves, boots, and hoods are tested in 
accordance with established US Army procedures. Both vapor and liquid 
challenges can be tested. Typical test agents include GB and HD, although other 
toxic industrial chemicals and sim ulants can also be used. The most common test 
performed is the liquid challenge/vapor permeation test, whereby swatches are 
exposed to 10 g/m2 liquid agent in a closed cell and vapor permeation profiles are 
determined using a MINICAMS or HYFED.
A num ber of test programs have been performed to assess the service life of 
commercial respirator filters against chemical agents. Filter cartridges and 
canisters are challenged against known concentrations of gases at different flow 
rates and humidities. Challenge gases include GB, CK, toxic industrial gases, and 
chemical sim ulants (e.g., DMMP). The tests measure the time it takes for the 
specific gas to penetrate the sorbent media. Respirator filters designed to provide 
protection against aerosols (i.e., particulate filters) are also tested for aerosol 
collection efficiency. Typical test aerosols include sodium chloride and dioctyl 
phthalate (DOP). Procedures adopted from the Code of Federal Regulations,
42 CFR Part 84, are used to assess the efficiency of particulate filters.
A wide variety of capabilities are available to evaluate the physiological effects of 
respirator wear on hum an performance:
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•  Vision testing to determine field-of-view, visual acuity, and light signal 
detection
•  Communication testing to measure speech intelligibility
•  Respiratory performance to assess carbon dioxide accumulation, oxygen 
consumption, inhalation and exhalation resistance, and other 
respiration param eters
•  Environmental chamber testing to assess performance at various 
tem peratures and humidities
•  Psychological and cognitive performance to quantify the psychological 
stress factors associated with respirator wear.
In summary, SBCCOM possesses unique capabilities in chemical and biological 
related areas with extensive experience in the test and evaluation of both military 
and commercial PPE. The system and component level tests described above 
address specific performance requirements for CB protection. Test methods used 
to evaluate PPE items for civilian applications have primarily been adopted from 
standard test procedures used to assess military PPE. Test protocols and criteria 
have been tailored to address key performance param eters based on the threat, 
intended use, and specific needs of the user. The lack of standardized test 
procedures and criteria, however, preclude SBCCOM from “qualifying” respirators 
for civilian CB applications. A review of existing military and industry standards in 
conjunction with a thorough analysis of available th rea t data  is required in order 
to establish suitable test procedures and test criteria for a national standard. The 
successful development of a national CB respiratory protection standard will rely 
on a sound understanding of the potential use scenarios, limitations of equipment, 
and hazards associated with emergency response operations in a CB environment.
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Jack  C. Sawicki 
GEOMET Technologies, Inc. 
Germantown, MD
From 1980-1986 Mr. Sawicki served as Safety Specialist with the International 
Association of Fire Fighters, Washington, D.C., and participated in development of 
the first safety and health program for firefighters. From 1986-1988, he served as 
Program Manager, Hazardous Materials Technical Center, Dynamac Corporation, 
Rockville, Maryland, where he was responsible for numerous programs in 
hazardous materials management for the Defense Logistics Agency and as an On­
site Supervisor, he was responsible for oversight of hazardous materials response 
operations. From 1988-1990, he served as Senior Technical Consultant, Arthur D. 
Little, Inc., Cambridge, M assachusetts, where he was responsible for management 
of num erous chemical and/or biological environmental protective systems 
research, development, testing and production programs.
Since 1990, Mr. Sawicki has served as GEOMET Technical Director, Life Support 
Systems, directing development of chemical and/or biological protective systems, 
including protective clothing, respirators, and other equipment. As GEOMET 
Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety Officer, he is responsible for 
regulatory compliance of GEOMET Chemical Surety Matériel (CSM) and biological 
agent (BSL-2) laboratory and Nonstockpile Demilitarization (Small Burials) 
Program field laboratories at Deseret and Dugway Proving Ground, Utah. He also 
serves as Environmental Emergency Response Team On-site Manager, and 
oversees incidents, such as the Riverside (California) Municipal Hospital 
Emergency Department chemical release incident.
ABSTRACT
Respirator Test Requirements for Chemical anc/or Biological 
Counter-Terrorism Operations
Chemical and/or biological counter-terrorism operations require coordinated 
response from many responders who will utilize many types of respirators, such as 
those listed in the following table.
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P o ssib le  R e s p ira to rs  fo r C o u n te r -T e r ro r is t  U se
Respirator Police Firefighter HazMat EMS Hospital
Airline SCBA No Possible Probable Possible Doubtful
SCBA Possible Yes Yes Probable No
4 CFM PAPR 
Full Face
Probable Probable Probable Probable Possible
4 CFM PAPR 
Half M ask/ 
Hood Combo
Possible Probable Probable Probable Probable
6 CFM PAPR 
Hood
Possible Possible Possible Probable Probable
Full Face Probable Possible Possible Possible Possible




Doubtful Doubtful Doubtful Possible Probable
“Escape”
Hood
Probable Possible Possible Probable Probable
Airline Hood No No No No Possible
Each respirator will require analysis, and probably testing, to assure that it is 
appropriate for the end use. Several factors will have to be taken into account:
•  Respiratory Protection
•  Chemical resistance of materials
•  Filtration requirements
oThreats: radioactives, organic vapors, other gases 
oRisk: concentration, duration
•  Training requirements
•  Physical requirements (e.g., beards)
•  Risk factors (separation from incident, decontamination efficacy, etc.)
•  Life cycle costs
As noted above, both selection and test requirements m ust be directly related to 
risk assessm ent. For example, sarin and m ustard gas are extremely toxic 
chemicals, with AELs in the range of 0.0001 m g/m 3. Without realtime monitoring 
in place, and without an adequate th reat and risk analysis, users would be 
required to wear positive pressure demand SCBA under a level A suit for the 
duration of an incident. It only takes consideration of the World Trade Center 
bombing, where hundreds of rescue workers required over 8 hours to evacuate the
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building, to recognize that there are not enough air cylinders available anywhere to 
support such an operation in a contaminated environment. Therefore, another 
type of respirator m ust be selected. To do so, one can utilize available data and 
common sense to determine what the appropriate protection can be.
Possible CW agent concentrations for various scenarios.
Amount released into 10,000 ft3 
space, 3  air changes/hour.
[sarin] [mustard]
1 Metric Ton 2000 m g/m 3 100 m g/m 3
55 gallon drum 200 m g/m 3 10 m g/m 3
5 gallon can 20 m g/m 3 1 m g/m 3
1 gallon jug 4 m g/m 3 0.02 m g/m 3
1 quart bottle 1 m g/m 3 0.005 m g/m 3
Because it is unlikely that a terrorist could release more than a few gallons in an 
enclosed space, and because most responders would be removed from the actual 
scene, only those in the immediate area of a release should be required to wear 
SCBA. For example, in a Tokyo-like sarin release, the concentration of vapor on 
the train might be on the order of 10 mg/m3, bu t on the platform, it is not likely be 
higher than  1 mg/m3, and on the escalators, no more than 0.1 mg/m3, etc.
With this approach in mind, if we use the first table and the various selection 
criteria to decide where the different respirators will be used, it should be possible 
to determine the appropriate test conditions for each.
In addition to deciding the appropriate concentrations for testing filters with 
chemical agents, a critical factor is which industrial chemicals require testing. A 
“short list” might include phosgene, chlorine, phosphine, cyanide, cyanogen 
chloride, hydrogen fluoride, dimethyl sulfate, and perhaps ammonia. A longer list 
is probable, and m ust be carefully determined.
After the obvious filter requirements, equally critical is the actual protection factor 
for each respirator. Currently, regulations determine what value is assigned to 
each respirator, based on design. However, we all know that the differences 
between high quality respirators and “ju n k ” are several orders of magnitude, even 
though both might have identical approvals. For example, the US Army gas mask 
can be fitted to over 95% of the adult population and achieve a protection factor of 
over 1,000. Some of the m asks issued to the Iraqi Army—also full face 
respirators—have a protection factor of 10. Is there any wonder why the Iraqis did 
not use chemical and biological weapons? Assigning an actual range of protection 
factors for each model of respirator could go a long way toward making selection 
by responders simpler.
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A secondary factor is chemical resistance of materials. Certain materials, like 
silicone, allow rapid permeation of certain CW agents. However, it is unlikely that 
the concentrations that will be encountered in a terrorist attack will be as high as 
those inside a chemical demilitarization facility (100 gm/m2), or even in the “kill 
zone” of a Soviet multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) chemical barrage 
(5-10 gm/m2). Thus, it is likely that the liquid threats that materials should be 
tested to are one or more orders of magnitude lower than  either of these scenarios.
In summary, it is possible for NIOSH and the Army to develop, and test to, 
reasonable criteria and produce data that will allow responders to make 
appropriate respirator selections.
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Samuel Benson 
Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management 
New York City
Samuel Benson is the Project Manager for Health and Human Services a t the New 
York City Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM). Under the direction of 
Jerome Hauer, the Director of OEM, he is the author of the New York City 
Biological Terrorism Contingency Plan. Mr. Benson is a paramedic who has 
worked in the New York City EMS system for 14 years, 9 of them  at NYC/EMS 
where he was one of the first paramedics trained to respond to hazardous 
materials incidents. Prior to coming to OEM, he spent two years as Coordinator of 
the Emergency Departm ent of Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center.
ABSTRACT 
Preparing to Meet the Challenge of Terrorism
New York City has been aggressively preparing to respond to the consequences of 
weapons of m ass destruction (WMD) terrorism for the past few years. The City 
started with a comprehensive analysis of the th reat and current resources. 
Planning assum ptions were established and programs put in place to develop a 
system of consequence management. The City performed an in-depth analysis of 
the emergency response system, the health care system, and the infrastructure. 
On the basis of the analysis, a number of initiatives (training, equipment, and 
exercises) were undertaken.
New York City has also worked with Federal agencies to develop a better 
understanding of how Federal assets could be used most effectively. Issues 
explored were: research and development, intelligence, federal response elements, 
and city/state/federal logistical interface
Mr. Benson concluded by noting that a chemical attack and a biological attack 
require different responses and that the civilian approach differs from the 
military’s in data, mission, and equipment.
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A P P E N D I X  B
R e g i s t r a n t s  a n d  A t t e n d e e s
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G L O S S A R Y  o f  A B B R E V I A T I O N S  &  A C R O N Y M S
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A C E P .............................................A m erican College of Em ergency P h ysician s
ACGIH .......................................... American Conference of G overnm ental Industrial H ygien ists
AEL ................................................Airborne E xposure Lim its
APF ................................................A ssigned Protection Factor
APR ................................................Air Purifying Respirator
A S T M ..............................................Am erican Society for T esting and M aterials
ATF ................................................A lcohol Tobacco and Firearms
A T S D R ...........................................Agency for Toxic S u b stan ces and D isease  Registry
A N S I................................................ American National S tandards Institute
APR ................................................Air-Purifying Respirator
B W A ................................................ B iological W arfare Agent
C B ................................................... C hem ical and/or B iological
CBIRF .......................................... C hem ical/B io log ica l Incident R esponse Force
C B R N C ...........................................Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear Countermeasures
C D C ................................................ Centers for D isease  Control and Prevention
C D F ................................................ C hem ical D em ilitarization  Facilities
C F R ................................................ Code of Federal R egulations
C H P P M ...........................................US Army C enter for Health Prom otion & Preventive M edicine
C h em T r ec ..................................... C hem ical T ransportation E m ergency C enter
CoMPIO ....................................... C onsequence M anagem ent Program Integration Office
CPC ................................................C hem ical Protective Clothing
CSEPP .......................................... C hem ical Stockpile Em ergency P reparedness Program
C W A ................................................ C hem ical Warfare Agent
D e c o n ..............................................D econtam ination
D E P ................................................ D epartm ent of E nvironm ental Protection
D E R ................................................ D epartm ent of E nvironm ental R esources
D H H S ..............................................D epartm ent of H ealth  and H um an Services
D O D ................................................ D epartm ent of D efen se
D O E ................................................ D epartm ent of Energy
D O H ................................................ D epartm ent of H ighways
D O J ................................................ Departm ent of J u stice
DOMS .......................................... D irectorate of Military Support
D O T ................................................ Departm ent of T ransportation
D M A T ............................................. D isaster  M edical A ssistan ce Team
DMORT ....................................... D isaster  Mortuary Team
D R D S ............................................. D ivision  of Respiratory D isease  S tu d ies
DTAPS .......................................... D isposal Toxic Agent Protective S u it
E C B C ............................................. SBCCOM’s Edgewood C hem ical B iological Center
E M S ................................................ Em ergency M edical Service
E M T ................................................ Em ergency M edical T echnician
E O C ................................................ E xecutive O perations C ouncil
E O D ................................................ Explosive O rdinance D isp osa l
EPA ................................................E nvironm ental Protection Agency
F B I ...................................................Federal Bureau of Investigation
F E M A ............................................. Federal Em ergency M anagem ent Agency
HazMat ....................................... Hazardous M aterials
HAZWOPER ...............................H azardous W aste O perations and Em ergency R esponse
H E P A ............................................. High Efficiency Particulate Air
IA F C ................................................ International A ssociation  of Fire Chiefs
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IAFF ............................................. International A ssociation  of Fire Fighters
IAPC ............................................. International A ssociation  of Police Chiefs
IC W U ............................................. International C hem ical W orkers Union
IDLH ............................................. Im m ediately D angerous to Life or H ealth
ISEA ............................................. Industrial Safety Equipm ent A ssociation
J P S G ............................................. J u stice -D efen se  Program S teerin g Group
JSGPM ....................................... Jo in t Service G eneral Purpose M ask
L p m ................................................Liters per m inute (US style)
M I S T .............................................M an-In-S im ulant-T est
MMRS .......................................... M etropolitan M edical R esponse S ystem
MMST .......................................... M etropolitan M edical Strike Team
MSDS .......................................... M aterial Safety D ata Sheet
MSHA .......................................... Mine Safety and H ealth  A dm inistration
N B C ................................................N uclear, B iological and C hem ical
NCID .............................................N ational Center for Infectious D iseases
NDMS .......................................... N ational D isaster  M edical System
NDPO .......................................... (FBI) N ational D om estic Preparedness Office
N F A ................................................N ational Fire Academ y
N F P A .............................................N ational Fire Protection A ssociation
NIJ ................................................N ational Institu te of Ju stice
N IO S H .......................................... National Institute for O ccupational Safety and H ealth
NIST .............................................N ational Institute of S tandards and Technology
NMRT .......................................... N ational M edical R esp onse Team
N R C ................................................N uclear Regulatory C om m ission
NREMT ....................................... N ational R egister of E m ergency M edical T echnicians
OEM................................................ (NYC) Office of Em ergency M anagem ent
O J P ................................................Office of Ju stice  Program
O L E S .............................................Office of Law E nforcem ent Standards
O S H A .............................................O ccupational Safety and H ealth  A dm inistration
O S L D P S ....................................... Office for State and Local D om estic P reparedness Support
P A P R .............................................Powered Air-Purifying Respirator
P E L ................................................Perm issible E xposure Limit
PF ...................................................Protection Factor
P H S ................................................Public H ealth Service
P P E ................................................Personal Protective E quipm ent
RAID .............................................N ational Guard Rapid A ssessm en t and Initial D etection
S B C C O M .....................................(US) Army Soldier and B iological C hem ical Command
S E L ................................................S tandardized E quipm ent List
S C B A .............................................Self-C ontained Breathing A pparatus
S C S R .............................................Self-C ontained S elf-R escuers
T B ...................................................T uberculosis
T E U ................................................T echnical E scort U nit
TIM ................................................Toxic Industrial M aterials
U S A M R IID ..................................US Army M edical R esearch In stitu te of Infectious D iseases
WDTC .......................................... W est D esert Test Center: US Army Dugway Proving Ground
W M D .............................................W eapons of M ass D estruction
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A P P E N D I X  D 
C h e m i c a l  a n d  B i o l o g i c a l  A g e n t s  o f  C o n c e r n
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Biological Agents
D is e a s e /C a u s a t iv e  A gen t In cu b a tio n
T im e
P h y s io lo g ic a l A ctio n
A nthrax/B  acillus A nthrac is 1-5 days Sym ptom  s include su d den  o n se t o f  difficu lty  
brea th ing , p ro fuse  sw eating , cyanosis (blue 
co lored  skin), shock, an d  death in  2 4-36 hou rs i f  
not treated.
P lague/Y  ersin ia  Pestis 1-3 days Sym ptom s inc lude sh ivering , vom iting , 
headaches, g iddiness, a n  in to lerance to light, pain 
in  th e  back and  lim bs, and  a w hite coating  on 
tongue. A  fever o f  103-106°F  occurs 
im m ediately . W ithin  24 hours coughing starts, 
then  spitting  up b lood. T he p lague is a n  acute 
d isease , i.e., it no rm a lly  doesn 't last a long tim e.
I f  you  recover, you w ill be im m une for the  rest o f  
your life.
Tularem  ia/F rancisella  T ularensis 1-10  days Sym ptom s resem b le  flu: fever, ch ills , headache, 
fa tigue and m uscle  aches. Som e persons have 
pneum on ia  ev iden t on chest X -rays; som e have 
ch est p a in  and/or cough  and w e ig h t loss. S w ollen  
lym ph nod es m ay also b e a sym ptom  . W ith 
an tib io tic  trea tm en t, T u la rem ia  is o n ly  fatal in 1­
3% o f  cases.
C h o lera /V ib rio  C holerae 2-5 days Sym ptom s in c lu de  profuse w a tery  diarrhea, 
vom iting , and  leg c ram ps. R ap id  lo ss o f  bod y  
flu ids leads to dehy d ra tio n  and shock. W ithout 
treatm ent, death  can occur w  ith in  hours.
V enezu elan E qu ine  Encep halitis 2-5 days Sym ptom  s include sud den o n se t o f  illness w ith  
g enera lized  m alaise , sp ik ing  fevers, rigo rs , severe 
h eadache, p h o to ph o b ia , and m ya lg ias . N ausea, 
v om iting , cough, sore throat, an d  d ia rrh ea  m ay 
follow . Full recovery  takes 1-2 w eek  s.
Q Fever /C oxiella  B urnetii 12-21  d ays Sym ptom s resem b le  flu: fever, ch ills , h eadache, 
fa tigue an d  m uscle aches. A p pro x im ate ly  % o f  
persons w ith  sym ptom s have pneum on ia  ev iden t 
on  ch est X -rays; som e w ill have chest p a in  and/or 
co ugh . T he du ratio n  o f  Q F ev er is 2 days to  2 
w eeks at w h ich  tim e the  d isease  reso lves w ith  no 
perm ane nt effects on the ind ividual.
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D is e a s e /C a u s a t iv e  A gen t L a ten cy P h y s io lo g ic a l A ctio n
B o tu lism /C lo strid iu m  B otu linum  
T oxin
3 days P rog ressiv e  para lysis  from  the  head  dow n. The 
indiv idual rem  ains m entally  a le rt and aw ake until 
d eath  occurs due to para lysis o f  th e  m uscles used 
fo r b rea th ing . B o tu lism  is fatal in  60%  o f  the 
cases if no t treated .
M u ltip le  O rgan
T oxicity/T  richothece ne M yco toxin
D ose D ependent N one A  vailable
S tap hy loco cca l E ntero tox em ia  (food  
po iso n ing )/S taph y loco ccu s 
E n te ro to x in  type B
1-6 days S ym ptom s in c lud e  sudden o nset o f  high fever 
(103-106°F ), ch ills , headache, m uscle  aches, dry 
cough , and  p o ss ib le  in flam a tio n  o f  the  lin ing o f  
the eyelids. A ltho ugh SEB is not ex pec ted  to 
p ro du ce  m any fatalities, it has the po ten tia l to 
in cap ac ita te  up to 80%  o f  p e rso n n e l in  the  area o f  
attack .
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Chemical Agents
Blister Agents
C h e m ic a l N am e R ate o f  A ctio n P h y s io lo g ic a l A ctio n
Distilled Mustard (HD) 
Bis(dichloroethyl) sulfide*
Delayed -  hours to days Blisters; destroys tissue; 
injures blood cells
Nitrogen Mustard (HN-1) 
N-ethyl-2,2'-di(chloroethyl)amine*
Delayed -  12 hours or 
longer
Blisters; destroys tissue; 
injures blood cells; affects 
respiratory tract
Nitrogen Mustard (HN-2) 
N-methyl-2,2'-di(chloroethyl)amine*
Delayed -  12 hours or 
longer
Blisters; destroys tissue; 
injures blood cells; 
Bronchopneumonia possible 
after 24 hrs
Nitrogen Mustard (HN-3) 
2,2',2"-Tri(chloroethyl)amine*
Delayed -  hours to days Blisters; destroys tissue; 




Rapid Blisters; destroys tissue; 
injures blood cells; systemic 
poisoning
Mustard-Lewisite mixture Prompt stinging; 
blistering delayed 
approximately 12 hrs
Blisters; destroys tissue; 
injures blood cells; systemic 
poisoning
Phenyldichloroarsine (PD) Immediate eye effects; 
din effects delayed 
approximately 1 hr
Irritates; causes nausea, 
vomiting and blisters
Ethyldichloroarsine (ED) Immediate irritation; 
delayed blistering
Irritates eyes; blisters; 
damages respiratory tract; 
systemic poisoning
Methyldichloroarsine (MD) Immediate irritation; 
delayed blistering
Irritates Respiratory tract; 
injures lungs and eyes; 
systemic poisoning
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B lood  A g e n ts
C h e m ic a l N am e R ate o f  A ctio n P h y s io lo g ic a l A ctio n
Hydrogen cyanide (AC) Rapid Interferes with body tissu es’ oxygen 
consumption; accelerates breathing rate
Cyanogen chloride (CK) Rapid Chokes; irritates; decreases breathing 
rate;
Arsine (SA) Delayed action -  2hr to 11 
days
Damages blood, liver and kidneys
C h o k in g  A g e n ts
C h e m ic a l N am e R ate o f  A ctio n P h y s io lo g ic a l A ctio n








I n c a p a c i ta t in g  A g e n ts
Chem ical Name Rate o f A ction Physiological A ction
3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate* (BZ) Delayed action -  1 to 4 hrs 
depending on exposure
Fast heart beat; dizziness; 
vomiting; dry mouth; blurred 
vision; stupor; random activity
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N e rv e  A g e n ts
















Rapid Cessation of breath; death
Methylphosphonothoic acid (VX) 
o-ethyl-S-(2-isop ropylaminoethy l) 
methylphosphonothiolate*
Rapid Produces casualties when inhaled or 
absorbed
T e a r  A g e n ts
Chem ical Name Rate of 
Action
Physiological Action
Chloroacetophenone (CN) Instantaneous Causes tearing; irritates eyes and 
respiratory tract
Chloroacetophenone in chloroform (CNC) Instantaneous Causes tearing; irritates eyes and 
respiratory tract
Chloroacetophenone and chloropicrin in 
chloroform (CNS)
Instantaneous Causes tearing, vomiting, and 
choking
Chloroacetophenone in benzene and 
carbon tetrachloride (CNB)
Instantaneous Causes severe tearing
Bromobenzylcyanide (CA) Instantaneous Irritates eyes and respiratory tract
o-Chlorobenzylmalononitrile (CS) Instantaneous Irritates eyes and 
respiratory tract
Dibenzoxazepine* (CR) Instantaneous Irritates eyes, skin, and respiratory 
tract
Chloropicrin (PS) Instantaneous Causes tearing, vomiting, and 
choking
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V o m itin g  A g e n ts
C h e m ic a l N am e R ate o f  A ctio n P h y s io lo g ic a l A ctio n




Rapid Causes cold symptoms; headache; 
nausea, vomiting
Diphenylcyanoarsine (DC) Rapid Causes cold symptoms; headache; 
nausea, vomiting
Appendix D information was excerpted from:
1) CBDCOM Domestic Preparedness Program, “Hazards, HAZMAT Technician, EMS Technician 
Courses,” Booz, Alien & Hamilton Inc., and Science Applications International Corporation, 1998.
2) Bradford, Janet K. “Biological Hazards and Emergency Management.” Journal o f  C ontingencies an d  
Crisis M anagem ent, Vol. 2 /1 ; 1994, 39-48.
3) Mann, Brad. “Preparing for Infectious Disease Invasions.” E m ergency P reparedn ess  D igest (Canada), 
Vol. 22, No. 2; Apr-June 1995, 1618.
* Chemical nam es added by NIOSH
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A P P E N D I X  E
I n t e r a g e n c y  E q u i p m e n t  S t a n d a r d i z a t i o n  B o a r d  M e m b e r s
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(7 0 2 )7 8 4 -5 8 9 8 holm and@ quan tico .us me. m il
(6 0 6 )2 93 -3 191 m arkjacobs@ sofsa.sair.com
(7 0 3 )6 9 5 -2 2 8 3 johns onw@ hqda-aoc .arm y.pen tagon .mil
(5 0 8 )2 3 3 -4 4 2 5 rkinney@ natick-em h2 .arm y.m il
(2 0 2 )2 6 7 -0 4 2 7 blecht haler@ comd t.u scg  .mil
(7 0 3 )6 93 -8 981 leej@ hqda-aoc.arm y.pen tagon .mil
(2 1 0 )4 9 6 -5 3 1 0 klukins@ garner-es.com
(8 1 8 )7 5 6 -8 6 3 9 loom up39@ aol.com
(5 0 8 )2 3 3 -5 4 3 3 rma rkey@ natick -em h 2. arm y . mil
(2 0 2 )3 2 4 -8 2 3 9 bym art@ erols.com
(9 1 0 )4 5 1 -5 0 6 5 murphyr@ clb.u smc. mil
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N a m e Organization
O’C onnell, Jeff 
Ryan, G ene Capt. 
Shellhamm er, Porter T. Chief 
Sm ith, Markham  
S ted m an , Joh n  
Steinm etz, Jay Col 
Sw an, Chuck P.
Thom as, W es Chief 
W atson, R onald D. Chief 
W hipple, M atthew  
W hite, Andrew
T SW G /Battelle  
C hicago Fire Dept 





D ow ners Grove Fire Dept 
LA C ounty Fire Dept 




(7 0 3 )4 1 3 -8 8 6 6  oconnelj@ battelle.org
(7 7 3 )2 3 3 -4 1 1 2  hitsq@ aol.com
(94 1)95 1-42 11 p sh ellh a@ co .sarasota .fl.u s
(7 0 3 )3 2 6 -8 5 7 2  m ark.sm ith@ osia.m il
(2 0 2 )6 1 6 -0 1 0 2  stedm anj@ ojp.usdoj.gov
(7 0 3 )6 9 3 -8 9 7 7  steinm  ej@ hqda-aoc. arm y, pen tagon .mil
(703)68 1 -9600  swan c@jpobd.osd .mil
(6 3 0 )4 3 4 -5 9 9 0  W es@ m w .sisna.com
(3 2 3 )8 8 1 -2 3 8 9  ellom 8@ aol.com
(5 0 8 )2 3 3 -4 0 4 7  m whipple@ natick-am  ed02.arm y.m il
(703 )2 7 3 -0 9 1 1  iem s@ iafc.org
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Delivering on the Nation’s Promise:
S a fe ty  a n d  h e a lth  a t w o rk  
F o r  a l l  p e o p le  
T h ro u g h  re se a rch  a n d  p re v e n t io n
Copies of National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
documents and information 
about occupational safety and health are available from
NIOSH—Publications dissemination 







DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2000-122
